

THE IRAQ INQUIRY

First Witness Statement of
Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck

I, Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck, born on the 20th August 1939, currently residing at Burgunderstr.26, D-79379 Müllheim/Baden, Germany WILL SAY as follows:

1. I worked for the United Nations for 32 years from 1968 to 2000. During this time I held various senior posts in different parts of the world. I was posted in Iraq from November 1998 to March 2000 at which time I held the position of UN Security Coordinator in Iraq at the level of an Assistant Secretary General. I was the highest ranking official of the UN posted to Iraq. I refer to a document marked "HVS1" which is a copy of my curriculum vitae.
2. During the time I served in Iraq my duties included negotiating on a six-monthly basis with the Government of Iraq, the UN supported humanitarian exemption and leading the UN Oil-for-food programme. In addition, I was responsible for the management of UN security. More generally, I represented the UN Secretary General in Iraq.
3. The American and British forces – to whom I will refer to as 'the Coalition' for the purposes of this statement - monitored the airspace 36° North 32° South of the Northern and Southern no-fly zones. During the period between 1990 and 1998 they did not act in an overtly aggressive manner. However, following four nights of bombing during Operation Desert Fox on 19th December 1998 it became clear that the coalition forces enlarged the rules of engagement, having subjectively widened the interpretation of the commonly accepted definition of 'self defence'. As a result it became increasingly the case that coalition forces were deliberately targeting military and non-military

targets by attacking them without any legal or other justification to do so. In fact, the existence of the no-fly-zones were without UN mandate and therefore illegal.

4. As the frequency of air attacks began increasing in regularity in the no-fly zones since January 1999, (both northern and southern), an established pattern of assaults emerged in the days before Desert Fox. These military operations were aggressive violations, which to my mind carried a sinister motive behind them. They were designed to be acts to destabilise and eventually prepare for war. Repeated claims by the coalition that their attacks were in 'self-defence' were simply not capable of being sustained. For example, following a particular sortie the coalition forces would claim that they were 'locked in' – that is, an Iraqi radar installation would fix on a coalition aircraft – however the response would be a retaliatory attack the following day!
5. As I say, the activities of the unilaterally established Anglo-American alliance began with Operation Provide Comfort which aimed to police northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from hostilities by Iraqi forces.
6. The operation grew into a large campaign of engagement and then developed into outright deliberate targeting of both military and non-military targets. The latter included for example, oil refineries, the airport in Basra and of course victimising civilians.
7. Any Iraqi military response in the face of the coalition force was ineffective. Iraqi military aircraft were not permitted to use their own air space insofar as this area was caught by the no-fly zones. As for the fire power of ground troops or military installations, these too were effectively redundant in that invariably the sorties flown by the coalition air force were at very high altitudes – beyond the reach of any ground fire, even surface to air missiles. The risk to coalition aircraft only arose in very limited circumstances when they chose to fly low over Iraqi military installations. Even though, there has not been a single occasion when coalition aircraft was brought down by Iraqi anti-aircraft installations.

8. On the other hand, the targeting by coalition military aircraft was, in many cases, indiscriminate in that little or no care was taken to distinguish between military targets (of which most were ineffective) and civilian targets.
9. The underlying mission of the coalition was quite apparently to destabilise Iraq. They attacked targets in the no-fly zones on many occasions even in the face of strenuous denials by the Iraqi government that there was 'nothing there'- in any particular location complained of by the coalition. At times coalition aircraft even entered the narrow strip of fly zones in central Iraq and inflicted there damage. The general civilian population were driven into fear and helplessness having been subjected to, or otherwise having witnessed, terrifying ordeals.
10. To give an idea of the measure of terror ordinary people had to endure; children began developing what Iraqis called the 'siren syndrome'. It was a condition which children developed whereby whenever they heard a siren as an air raid commenced they became petrified, started to cry and run to their mothers.
11. The British and American governments were sending out a message by their conduct; they meant business and were acting pursuant to a mandate of destruction not protection. On record however, they sought to rely on, albeit wrongly, Security Council resolutions, claims of self-defence and the right of humanitarian intervention. The coalition was simply engaged in a campaign to prepare the ground for war. The best conditions for war (from the coalition's perspective) could be achieved by performing the sorts of acts they carried out to wipe out any potential military targets and to instill profound fear in the civilian population to likewise render any risk of opposition or harm from them useless.
12. As the Head of UN Security in Iraq part of my responsibility entailed ensuring the safety of all UN staff working in Iraq. The risk to the safety of UN staff increased significantly as the activities of the coalition over the no-fly zones increased and so did the risk for the destruction of vital humanitarian supplies (food, medical supplies, agricultural implements, etc.) which UN convoys transported to different parts of Iraq.

13. On 25th January 1999 there were two attacks by the coalition at Al-Jumhuriya and Abu Khaseeb. I have referred to these on page 212 of my book "A Different Kind of War. The UN Sanctions in Iraq". I produce an extract which comprises Chapter 3: The No-fly Zones, the Humanitarian Programme and Changed Security in Iraq following Operation Desert Fox, marked "HVS2". Al-Jumhuriya and Abu Kaseeb were both residential areas in [Basra]. A cruise missile was fired at Al-Jumuriya and Abu Khaseeb was also bombed.

I attended the funeral of the victims in Abu Khaseeb. There were seventeen dead. The Iraq government claimed that eleven people died. This conflicted with what I personally observed and was hardly proof that the Iraqi authorities had inflated the number of victims as the British Government claimed!

14. Given all the circumstances I have described above, the danger to my staff (who continued to travel around the country) and the further civilian fatalities at Al-Jumuriya and Abu Khaseeb, as the UN Security Coordinator, I felt compelled to commence compiling official records of the air strikes and the resulting casualties and damage.
15. As a consequence of my decision to do so, as UN Head of Security, I gave instructions to all UN officials travelling within Iraq to report back any incidents of air strikes. A decision would then be taken whether to halt humanitarian operations and whether or not to investigate an incident reported back to us in Baghdad. If we decided to investigate either a team would be sent out to undertake the exercise or I would conduct the investigation myself. On occasions we recorded incidents as reported in the media or the Iraqi Ministry of Defence without verifying them. (Such incidents were marked "Details Unknown" in the report referred to below as "HVS3".)
16. I refer to a document marked "HVS3" entitled 'Air Strikes in Iraq & Reported Civilian Casualties and Damages 28 December 1988 – 31 December 1999' which was prepared by my security staff in Baghdad and with details of air strikes against civilian sites and resulting in civilian casualties.
17. The report is divided into sections namely airstrikes as a whole, air strikes where civilian casualties occurred with an annex entitled 'Impact of Air Strikes on UN Operations in Iraq' which detailed particular air strikes that occurred in the vicinity of UN staff or which had led to repeated temporary halt of UN road traffic.

18. The report contains an introduction which summarises my findings for the period my office conducted investigations on behalf of the UN:

"AIR STRIKES IN IRAQ

28 December 1998 – 31 December 1999

Since the beginning of the present series of air strikes by the Allied war planes in the Northern and Southern no-fly zones of Iraq on 28 December 1998 and until the end of December 1999, bombing has reportedly taken place on 132 out of 369 days – i.e., 36% of the days had witnessed air strikes either in the Northern or in the Southern or both Northern and Southern no-fly zones. On 56 days, the airstrikes resulted in civilian casualties. According to available information, supplied by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), which in 5 cases were directly verified as correct by UN teams, 144 civilians had died and 446 civilians had sustained varying injuries as a result of these air strikes (57 deaths and 133 injuries in the Northern-no-fly-zone and 87 deaths and 313 injuries in the Southern no-fly zone). Statistics show that if each day's air strike is treated as an incident, 42% of the total number of incidents resulted in civilian casualties. In effect, every second day of airstrikes lead to civilian casualties! Available information indicates that civilians lost their lives in 35 different locations and they sustained injuries in 64 different locations. 85 houses were also partially or fully demolished in the process.

The maximum impact was felt around the city of Basra in the South and the city of Mosul in the North (see chart). Two self-explanatory maps showing the impact of air strikes, a table and a chart showing the civilian casualties and the chronology of the air strikes (as recorded by the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator/Iraq, Baghdad) are attached."

Two maps are then produced of Iraq delineating the areas of the no-fly zones: above the 36th parallel and below the 33rd parallel. (This was subsequently extended to 32°). Points of attack by coalition military aircraft are marked up denoting death, injury, death and injury and physical damage for the period 28th December 1998 to 31st December 1999. There are two maps. The first deals with all reported and investigated air strikes and the second records civilian casualties only.

Next there is an illustration, in a bar graph, of numbers of civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) for the period in question, in the various governorates.

Following the graph there is a two page table entitled, 'Airstrikes. Table Showing Reported Civilian Casualties and Damages in Iraq'.

19. The table illustrates deaths and injuries and damage to property in various areas in the designated Governorates in Iraq.
20. There follows two further sets of tables setting out details of attacks for the period 28th December 1998 to 12th December 1999 and from 25th January 1999 to 12th December 1999.
21. Finally, there is an annex to the report, also marked "confidential" and entitled "impact of airstrikes on UN operations in Iraq, 28th December 1998 – 31st December 1999, prepared by the Office of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq, Baghdad. March 2000.
22. Under the section "analysis" the report states:

"Roughly about 65% of the total area of Iraq falls under the Southern and Northern no-fly zones. Geographical, Sectoral and Multi-disciplinary Observers of the United Nations, the Inspection Agents and the Oil Overseers, regularly travel in these areas on almost all working days of the week. Besides during the day, they also have to travel during daytime as night travel is not authorised by the Designated Official for Security. This leads to the vulnerability of staff members to air strikes, which take place with few exceptions, only during daytime – The number of staff members so exposed is about 30 to 40 on any working day.

Following heavy air strikes, UN staff was withdrawn, e.g., from Basra and Mosul/Kirkuk, earlier this year. The strikes have been totally unpredictable, making it difficult to implement any meaningful precautionary measures. The only discernible pattern so far has been in the north near Mosul and a movement restriction is already in force there. There have been instances of staff members expressing apprehensions about their safety and security and those who have witnessed the strikes have shown obvious signs of stress and strain as reported by their supervisors.

A table giving brief description of each of the 25 incidents and a map of Iraq depicting the geographical distribution of these events are attached."

23. On one occasion in April/May 1999, I was accompanied by the UN Guard Contingent who were stationed in Iraqi, Kurdistan. At the time, as I say, I was the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the entire area covered by Iraq, including Iraqi Kurdistan.

24. During the first week of May 1999, while I was travelling in Iraqi Kurdistan, I was informed of an incident that occurred in Bashiqa in the Ninevah province, near Mosul on 30th April 1999. As a result I decided not to return to Baghdad in order to investigate the incident. At the time two vehicles with the UN Guard Contingent were with me. I first sought the agreement with the Governor of Bashiqa. I visited the area.
25. When I arrived at the scene – a location on open plains near the village of Kuban- I witnessed total carnage. I was taken to the scene by some of the local residents who reported that a group of shepherds had been killed there following missile attacks.
26. At the scene I was overwhelmed with the smell of decaying flesh. The putrid smell was unbelievable. All around, covering a considerable area, there were what appeared to be sheep carcasses and pieces of their fleece and decaying flesh and I also saw huge craters, which appeared to have been created as a result of the impact of missiles. I saw the mangled remains of a water tank that had been destroyed. It contained perforations which appeared to have been created by shrapnel or bullets or both. There were also pieces of the shepherds' tent strewn across the area.
27. The shepherds' pick-up truck was also at the scene. It was burnt and destroyed.
28. I investigated the incident and the details were subsequently recorded in the report. The attack took place on 30th April 1999.¹ The entries in the report for this incident record:

Allied war planes carried out several sorties over the areas of the Ninewa Governorate. The jets fired four missiles at Bashiqa area near Mosul city. At Kuban village (30 km – Mosul) seven civilians were killed, a shepherd and six members of his family. 101 livestock were killed and one vehicle was damaged.
29. I confirm that in fact six civilians were killed and the figure of seven in the report is an error. I remember vividly that witnesses reported the deaths of

¹ I met with the then former Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in Brighton in 2004. He stated to me that he could never understand why the American air force would not distinguish between sheep and anti aircraft installation.

six individuals and this was the subject of discussion when this part of our report was compiled. Two adults and four children were killed.

30. I personally verified, at the time of my visit to the area, that no military site existed anywhere in the immediate locality of the attack. The closest place of anything remotely resembling a military installation was some four to five miles away. There appeared to be some barracks in a small one storey building and an installation that looked like a radar facility. I therefore concluded that the point where the attack took place could not reasonably be mistaken for a military site. Moreover, witnesses recounted to me that there were repeated attacks over a period of time and several missiles were fired by low flying aircraft. This was consistent with the several large craters in the ground which I observed.
31. There were other incidents of attacks by Coalition aircraft involving sheep. I investigated another similar incident near Erbil which was near Kurdistan. This time no civilians were killed. The bombing took place over the new line of control separating the locally autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan from the other 15 governorates under the control of the Government of Iraq. This created a serious incident as the Kurds initially interpreted the attack as one that may have been initiated by Baghdad. Fortunately this incident could be clarified as having been caused by stray munition that had been fired by Iraqi anti aircraft installations against intruding coalition aircraft.
32. The report records many incidents against (the) non-military targets, damage to private property and so on.
33. During 1999 it became apparent to us in the United Nations that the Coalition pilots indeed had been given a significantly greater range of freedom to attack targets. They became increasingly bold with their missions and increasingly aggressive. Their aims were clearly to destabilise the region irrespective of the cost of life and property.
34. Even though the Office of UN Secretary General had welcomed these air strike reports and they had been welcomed by some members of the UN Security Council, the UN Security Office in New York discontinued maintaining records of attacks after I left Iraq in March 2000.

35. Copies of the report were delivered to the UK House of Commons by me personally, twice, during 1999. In July 1999 I gave evidence before Claire Short's International Development Committee, a committee of eleven MPs from the three major political parties chaired by Bowen Wells, MP of the Conservative Party. The air strike reports were also provided during personal visits to Ambassador Burley at the US Mission to the UN in New York, and to Ambassador Eldon of the UK Mission to the UN in May and September 1999 respectively. The reports were provided, together with pictures and other evidence to the British and American authorities. The Foreign Office in London were also offered a copy of the report by me personally. I attempted to hand a copy to the Director General for the Middle East, FCO. I was told he was travelling at the time. Instead I was made to see a junior member of staff in an unfriendly and uncomfortable manner. This individual had a cursory glance of the report and returned it to me with a dismissive attitude. Clearly both I and my report were unwelcome.
36. I received confirmation in October 1999 from Secretary General Kofi Annan's Chief of Cabinet commanding the report and stating that it was invaluable. I was told to continue with such reporting.

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement to be true

Signed:  Dated: 23 September 2010

Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck

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**FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT of
COUNT HANS-CHRISTOF VON
SPONECK**

Quist Solicitors
12th Floor
The Broadgate Tower
20 Primrose Street
London
EC2A 2EW

Tel: 020 7596 2813
Fax: 020 7596 2799
Ref: AR/CL/6910

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First Witness Statement of
Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck

This is the exhibit marked "HVS1" in the first witness statement of Count Hans von Sponeck.

Hans-C. Graf Sponeck
Former UN Assistant Secretary General &
United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq

March 2010

Current Address:
Burgunderstr. 26
D-79379 Muellheim/ Germany
Tel. 49-7631-937910

I. Academic Background:

- Received initial schooling at Schule Schloss Salem (Germany) and Marlborough College (UK), Abitur, 1959.
- Attended the Universities of Bonn and Tübingen in Germany and Washington and East-West Center in USA. Obtained BA and MA Degrees in Demography and Physical Anthropology.
- Thesis on "Patterns of Transatlantic Migrations".
- Received fellowship award from the Foundation Zelidja/France to work with Refugees in Hongkong (1960-61) as well as teaching and research assistantships from Washington State University and the East-West Center.
- Attended Training Programmes at the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI), Washington, the ILO's Training Centre/Turino, and the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague.

II. Professional Background

- Development Officer in the German Foundation for International Cooperation, Bonn, 1966-68.
- United Nations/UNDP -- 1968-2000, with the following assignments:
 - a) Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP, Accra/Ghana, 1968-72.
 - b) Area Officer for Liberia/Sierra Leone at UNDP Headquarters, New York, 1973-75.
 - c) Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP, Islamabad/Pakistan, 1975-79.
 - d) Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP, Ankara/Turkey, 1979-83.
 - e) UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Gaborone/Botswana, 1983-88.
 - f) UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Islamabad/Pakistan, with concurrent responsibility for parts of Afghanistan, 1988-1994.
 - g) UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, New Delhi/India, 1994-97.

- h) UNDP Regional Representative & Director, European Office, Geneva/Switzerland, 1997-98.
- i) UN Assistant Secretary General & United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Baghdad/Iraq, 1998-2000.

Teaching:

United Nations System Staff College, Torino/Italy, 2000-present
 University of Marburg, Germany at i) the Centre for Conflict Research (2005-present) and ii) the Centre for Near and Middle East Studies (2009-present)

III. Special Professional Interests:

- i. Concepts of human and military security and conflict prevention, management and resolution.
- ii. Sanctions and humanitarian crises.
- iii. Relief-rehabilitation-development linkages and the international response.
- iv. Institutional reform and management of development.
- v. Population-environment-poverty-development relationship.
- vi. The United Nations, Multilateralism and Alliances
- vii. Geo-politics in the Middle East and South Asia

IV. Publications:

Papers and articles in German, English and other languages in professional journals and magazines on subjects of human security, links between development and environment, multilateral sanctions, humanitarian exemptions and responsibility to protect.

- Books:
- 1. Human Development - Is There An Alternative? , New Delhi, 1997.
 - 2. Irak - Chronik eines gewollten Krieges, Cologne, 2003
 - 3. A Different Kind of War - The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq, 2004 & 2006 (in English, Arabic, German and Spanish)

V. Professional Memberships:

Kalahari Conservation Society; The Southern African Wildlife Society; The Society for International Development; Fondation Zelidja (France).
 Associate, The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF), Lund (Sweden); Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft,

VI. Memberships:

Board Member (Health), Ranbaxy Corporation, New Delhi/India, 1996-97.

Board Member, AIESEC, New Delhi/India, 1995-97.
Board Member, United World College, Trieste, Italy, 2001-
Board Member, GNG, New York, USA, 2001-2005
Board Member, Transnational Foundation, Lund, Sweden, 2006-2010
Advisory Board, King & Zollinger Development Consultants, Zürich, CH, 2003-
Advisory Board, Kant Stiftung, Freiburg, Germany 2005-
Advisory Board, Perdana Global Peace Organisation, KL, Malaysia, 2006-
Advisory Board, Brussels Tribunal, Belgium, 2004-
Member, World Future Council, Hamburg and London, 2006-
Chairman, UN Millenium Centre, Basel/Switzerland, 2006-2009

VII. Honours:

Order of St. John (Johanniter), 1989 (Germany).
Arab/American Anti-Discrimination Committee, Humanit. Award, 2000, (USA)
Coventry Peace Prize, 2000, Church of England,(UK)
Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility, Peacemaker Award, 2001 (USA)
Bremen Peace Prize, 2003 (Germany)
University of Marburg/Germany - Honorary Doctorate (2010)

VIII. Languages: English, French and German

IX. Nationality: German

X. Date and Place of Birth: 20 August 1939, Bremen/Germany.

XI. Married, with three children

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Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck


This is the exhibit marked "HVS2" in the first witness statement of Count Hans von Sponeck.

Chapter 3

The No-Fly Zones, the Humanitarian Programme and Changed Security in Iraq following Operation Desert Fox

Thursday 16 December 1998 had indeed been a fateful day for Iraq and the United Nations. It was the day on which the Government of US took a big step beyond its declared Iraq containment policy. The October 1998 Iraq Liberation Act of the US Congress was no longer just an intention. Not long before midnight, US and UK war planes began their attack of Iraqi installations within and outside the no-fly zones. 'Operation Desert Fox', as it was called, lasted for four days during which about two hundred civilians lost their lives and seventy regime buildings in Baghdad were wholly or partially destroyed.¹ This included the Ba'ath Party headquarters, the Iraqi intelligence services building, state radio and television, the biological research centre at Baghdad University, the Ibn Al Haytham Missile R & D Centre, the Directorate of General Security (near the UN offices), the Special Security Organization (SSO) headquarters, the Special Republican Guards (SRG) headquarters and the SSO Communication and Computing Centre. No one knows the number of military personnel who perished in this attack.

As mentioned earlier, Iqbal Riza, the Chef de Cabinet of Kofi Annan, had called me in the early hours of that day to warn us of a possible full evacuation of UN international staff in Iraq in the event that an attack would happen. Following this call I rushed to my office at the Canal Hotel on the outskirts of Baghdad to convene a meeting of all senior UN officials who formed the security management team. As the designated official for security, I was responsible to the UN Secretary-General for UN staff security in Iraq. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and



The Fateful Breakfast.
Courtesy of Matthias Schwoerer.

1. See UNOCHI/Baghdad Press Clippings dated 19 January 1999, p. 9.

its disarmament personnel, located in the same Canal Hotel offices as the rest of us, decided not to be part of this mechanism. UNSCOM had its own security arrangements. UNSCOM had its own call signs and security checks as well as its separate evacuation plan. Even at critical moments, as on 16 December 1998, there was no contact between the UNSCOM administration and the rest of the UN community. Under one blue and white UN flag flying over the Canal Hotel offices in Baghdad were two distinct United Nations – a remarkable anomaly.

While I had developed friendly relations with UNSCOM's officer in charge at the time, Colonel Jaako Yitalo from Finland, it ultimately made no difference in terms of unifying our security systems. Much later I understood why: it was due to the mindset of UNSCOM's Chairman, Ambassador Richard Butler. For him, the nature of UNSCOM's disarmament mission was so unique that, in his opinion, it had to insulate itself. This included times when all UN staff, regardless of their assignments, were facing identical threats to their well-being. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was more than unhappy about Butler's imperial style. We in Baghdad could see that his insular approach had permeated the 'ranks' and created unnecessary acrimony in the daily lives of the UN humanitarian and disarmament communities. It was symptomatic of Butler's approach that he met with the Acting Permanent Representative of the US to the United Nations, Ambassador Peter Burleigh, in the US mission in New York on 15 December rather than with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan prior to presenting his report to the UN Security Council a day later.

There has been much speculation about the content of this discussion and earlier meetings between Butler and US diplomats. Had these influenced the wording of his transmittal letter to the UN Security Council, the content of UNSCOM's report and his eventual presentation of the report to the UN Security Council on 16 December?

While Butler reported to the UN Security Council, Bill Clinton, the US President had given the order to attack Iraq. As the UNSCOM Chairman was speaking and the UN Secretary-General listening to the presentation in the Council he was handed a note which broke the news that the United States, joined by Britain, had begun the attack on Iraq. The UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General could do no more than to take note of this grave violation of international law and the belittling of the United Nations that resulted from this US/UK unilateral act. There was a justified sense of helplessness in the corridors of the United Nations, not only in New York but wherever there was a UN presence around the world. In Baghdad we were devastated.

In terse language a US government document records for 16 December 1998: 'Following Iraq's recurrent blocking of UN weapons inspectors, President Clinton ordered four days of air strikes against military and

security targets in Iraq that contribute to Iraq's ability to produce, store, and maintain weapons of mass destruction and potential delivery systems.² While Chef de Cabinet Iqbal Riza had alerted me on 16 December of the possibility that UN staff might have to be evacuated out of Iraq, Richard Butler had already ordered the evacuation of UNSCOM's staff. My UN colleagues and I tried to make arrangements for establishing the Canal Hotel as a 'safe-haven' area where our staff would have to await further instructions. UNSCOM staff were leaving.

Just before the departure of the UN disarmament personnel, I became more aware of the division between UNSCOM and other members of the UN family in Baghdad. We had two immediate reasons to ask UNSCOM for help. I wanted to secure two or three seats in UNSCOM's large aircraft for staff with special medical conditions. Secondly, I hoped UNSCOM would take some of the cash our administration had in its possession which might fall into the wrong hands in case of turmoil during the crisis. In the absence of any banking services, the UN system had to bring its entire monthly payroll in cash into Iraq. On 16 December 1998 the finance unit in my office held about \$1 million in cash.

I personally went to the second floor of the UN building to talk to UNSCOM's administrative officers. The appearance of non-UNSCOM staff in their premises was a rare event: we seldom had reason to go there. Now that they were about to leave, such a visit was even more unexpected and less welcome. The answers to my requests were brief and curt: 'We have no extra seats in the aircraft and cannot take cash that does not belong to us.' I left UNSCOM premises disappointed and again wondering why they did not want to accept that in these difficult moments 'we' should be part of 'us'. On the same day, I wrote to the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, Iqbal Riza: 'UNSCOM personnel left us yet again without any hand-over.' I ended the communication to Riza with the conclusion that 'the entire history of behaviour of UNSCOM that I have seen while here is a shameful chapter in the UN book for Iraq'.³

'It would be prudent to take measures to ensure the safety and security of UNSCOM staff presently in Iraq', Butler had been told by US Ambassador Burleigh on 15 December in the US mission in New York. 'I told him that I would act on this advice and remove my staff from Iraq,' Butler recounts.⁴ One can only wonder why UNSCOM staff were singled out by the United States Government for 'early' protection. Only in a later 'advisory' were Secretary-General Kofi Annan's office and the UN Security Coordinator in New York encouraged by US authorities to evacuate the 'other' staff.

2. GAO-04-651T.

3. Fax to Iqbal Riza, Chef de Cabinet, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 16 December 1998.

4. Butler, 2000, p. 224.

The 'I would act' and 'remove my staff' was not the language of a senior United Nations civil servant involved in a complex political crisis. Even though Ambassador Butler travelled, as we all did, with a UN 'issey-passé', in spirit he never was an international civil servant: he made no secret of the fact that the UN Security Council and not the UN Secretary-General had appointed him to his post. This was another unfortunate 'first' created by the Security Council. Butler thus considered forming, briefing and exchanging views with the UN Secretary-General; 'discretionary' and not part of his formal terms of reference. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was not seen as a 'welcomed colleague' on the UN Secretary-General's floor at UN headquarters in New York.

On the evening of 16 December 1998, all 200 UNSCOM personnel had left Iraq and all 450 'other' UN international staff were in Iraq, half in Baghdad, the other half in Iraqi Kurdistan. The UN offices at the Canal Hotel had been converted into an international 'refugee' camp with staff, and a few dependants, from all over the world awaiting uncertain developments. 'Would there really be an attack?' was the question in everyone's mind. The UN security management team and I had a host of immediate concerns: would 250 people really fit into the hallway on the round floor?

We had identified this location as the best place for our safety, since there were no windows and only an exit glass door. Would there be enough water and food for up to a week? Markus, the cafeteria manager, an Iraqi Christian, had left us with a good stock of fruit, vegetables, bread, ice and meat, but we had no idea how long these supplies would last.

The UN offices had previously been a hotel training school. This was unfortunate for us since practically every office had been a bedroom and therefore had adjacent bathrooms. However, what would happen to the sanitary facilities if there was a breakdown in water services? How would the Iraqis react to us in case of an attack? There was the Iraqi public who could turn their anger against us and there was also the Iraqi military – 159 officers and soldiers – who had been assigned by the Government to protect our compound. We had good relations with them through regular contact: they were given a meal a day, but how would we be able to feed them under such circumstances? Would they change their friendly attitude toward us? Adjacent to the eastern side of the UN building was an Iraqi military psychiatric hospital.⁵ Could we expect problems from that direction? What could we expect from the Iraqi Government?

Uppermost in my mind was the question of how we would cope should there be a hit on our building. Near to our 'bunker floor' was the UNOCHI health unit. This proximity was good, but was the unit really equipped to handle a large number of potential cases?

Our Romanian doctor's more immediate concern was the mental preparedness of the staff for the looming crisis. At a staff meeting I convened in the late afternoon of 16 December Dr Gilda Mukungu pleaded with us to drink as much water as possible, since this would 'have a good effect on your anxiety level ... and avoid alcohol as much as possible'. This was important advice. During the lunch I had had a few hours earlier in our cafeteria, I sat briefly with four colleagues who had decided to 'enrich' their meal with a bottle of campari. Twenty minutes later, when I left the dining hall, I saw the empty bottle. In difficult missions, particularly in conflict areas, the UN did face problems of this kind; Baghdad was no exception. We were aware of such problems but alcohol consumption was not easy to control, especially at times of acute crises. For these four difficult days and nights of Operation Desert Fox the doctor's reminder was, therefore, timely.

A second question that troubled me greatly was the possible interruption of food distribution and medicines to hospitals and health centres should there be an attack. The majority of Iraqis depended on the food basket, but neither our international nor our Iraqi staff, nor the 50,000 food agents in the eighteen governorates would be able to help under conditions of war. WFP food trucks would not move, the food warehouses would be unattended, and no new humanitarian supplies would enter Iraq.

During the late morning of 16 December, after the departure of the UNSCOM staff, I joined Ambassador Prakash Shah, the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General,⁶ to meet Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz at his office along the Tigris River near the Al Jumhuriya Bridge.⁷ As we entered his spacious office on the top floor of the Planning Ministry, we found ourselves opposite two stern-looking Iraqi officials, Tariq Aziz and Dr Riyadh Al Qaysi, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. After a tirade of angry words about Richard Butler, Tariq Aziz conveyed to us that the report Butler had submitted to the UN Security Council in no way reflected the progress that had been made by Iraq in eliminating weapons of mass destruction. He said that the report had exaggerated the conflicts

6. Prakash Shah, in mid-1990 India's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, had been appointed to this post following Kofi Annan's February 1998 visit to Baghdad. Shah was to be the 'diplomatic bridge' between the UN in New York and the Iraq Government in Baghdad. This was a genuine effort of the UN Secretary-General that in practice, however, made little difference in the relations between the Government of Iraq and the UN.
7. 'Bridge of the Republic'.

5. This was the 'soft spot' in the security of the UN offices at the Canal Hotel since only a thin wire fence separated the UN premises from the open area in front of the military hospital. It was here, not surprisingly, that a suicide bomber had chosen to hit the UN building on 29 August 2003, killing 22 persons. Among them was Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

it had arisen between groups of UN weapons inspectors and Iraqi officials in the weeks before UNSCOM's withdrawal. Aziz made a reference an incident in which a team of UN inspectors had been refused entry into Ba'ath Party headquarters in Baghdad. 'We expected nothing else - there is a liar and a tool of the United States,' Defiantly, he added. 'We are prepared for an attack.' Under-Secretary Qaysi remained silent but his face showed agreement and deep concern. It was a short meeting at the end of which I reminded Tariq Aziz that it was Iraq's responsibility, as the host country, to protect the UN mission in Iraq during this crisis. I wanted to make the point that the military guarding the UN compound should be vigilant to possible public anger against the United Nations Security Council and by extension the UN's presence in Baghdad. 'We will do all we're rest assured', were Tariq Aziz's parting words as we left his office.

When the Baghdad sun had set and the sun in New York began to rise, telephones started to ring as they had during the previous evening. Everyone wanted to give us advice and words of comfort and encouragement. This made us feel good but also reinforced our conviction that they knew more than we did. Just after 6 P.M., the Executive Director of the Iraq Programme in New York, Benon Sevan, called to tell me that the Secretary-General had decided to carry out an evacuation of the UN international staff in Iraq, except for a small group of my colleagues which should stay behind. This was what I wanted to hear. I had heard that there would be an UNSCOM-type departure leaving no UN presence in the country. I was truly relieved that Kofi Annan felt the same and had taken the wise decision not to evacuate the entire UN community; Heffinck's and my plan could be shelved. (Earlier in the day another security management team meeting, the UNICEF representative Philippe Heffinck, a Belgian colleague, and I agreed that two of us would remain, even if a full evacuation had been agreed upon. That this would have disciplinary, insurance, legal and personal implications did not concern us at that time.) I did remember how comfortable I had felt as UN Resident Coordinator in Islamabad in the early 1990s when the UN evacuated all staff from Afghanistan to Pakistan the last days of the Najibullah regime. The ICRC and *Médecins Sans Frontières* had remained in Kabul.

The telephone conversation with Benon Sevan who called me in both capacity as the senior official in the Iraq programme in New York and charge of worldwide security for UN offices and missions, turned to practical aspects of the evacuation. Washington, he pointed out, wanted a dawn evacuation. 'We cannot be responsible for the safety of UN staff on the road after 9 A.M.', was the conclusion of the American officials who contacted Sevan's office. I told Sevan that we were prepared for the evacuation and that six buses had been hired from an Iraqi company and were parked in our compound. The drivers had been instructed to report

for duty at 8 o'clock the next morning. With telephone lines in Baghdad down we, however, would not have any way of contacting them at this time to prepare for such an early departure. The time of departure demanded by the Americans could, therefore, not be met. Sevan was indignant and I was insistent.

A gloomy atmosphere permeated the UN family huddled together at the Canal Hotel. Would air-strikes really occur? We continued to hope that they would not until just before midnight when the Russian liaison officer of UNIKOM received a call from General Esa Tarvainen, a Finnish colleague and Force Commander at UNIKOM headquarters in Um Qasr on the Iraq-Kuwait border, to inform us that 'a large formation of foreign aircraft has just crossed the border into Iraq at high altitude'.

The UNIKOM officer's prediction that they would reach Baghdad within an hour proved to be right. First Baghdad was awoken by local sirens, followed soon after by Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries and the incredible noise of the impact of bombs. The US and UK air forces were above Baghdad. With a bullhorn, UN staff in the building were alerted to go immediately to our 'bunker', the hallway on the ground floor. In retrospect, had there been a direct hit on the building, the location we had chosen would not have protected us very much. But we had little choice: this was the best available alternative. The effect of sounds which many colleagues had never heard in their lives was profound. We were all frightened. To my surprise, male colleagues were much more affected than female staff. It was difficult to ease this atmosphere. I attempted it by making jokes and teasing staff so that they could laugh. Some did and this reassured others. We had distributed narrow foam mats for each staff member. In one of the earlier staff meetings I announced that it would be against the rules to have two persons on one mat. In the middle of the night, when most people were half-awake and worried, I noticed a husband and wife - she with an opera singer's opulence and he, diminutive and resembling Woody Allen, were lying together on one of these mats. 'Two people lying on one mat is a punishable offence', I said in a loud voice. A hundred heads went up and there was an explosion of laughter. It improved the mood in the 'bunker'.

After four long hours of heavy bombardment we received the message from the border that the formation had left Iraq and returned to their bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other locations in the Gulf. The sudden silence had a palliative effect; the UN compound in Baghdad had at last found sleep. I decided to spend this long night mostly in my office on the first floor - slightly against the rules, since everyone else had been told to be in the 'bunker'. Periodically, I returned to the ground floor, however, to make sure everything was in order. My assistant, Sriniv and I would alternatively sleep in our adjacent offices so that one of us would be available at all times to respond to incoming calls ... and they came, some

UN headquarters, others from UN agencies in Europe and elsewhere, and many from media around the world competing for the best news from an embattled Baghdad. I had told my spokesman, George Sommervill, to tell journalists, if they asked when we would be aving, 'The UN does not run when it gets hot!'

The subsequent coverage was uneven. It was sober from the *Christian Science Monitor* and *Le Monde Diplomatique* and ridiculous from the Boulevard press. The *Bild Zeitung*, a widely read tabloid in Germany, had a front page article with a bulky headline which read: 'Baghdad is Burning,' allegedly based on an interview with me which I had never given.

The reality which I saw the following morning looked quite different. Wanting to assess the damage that had been done during the night, I drove with my Iraqi driver, Abu Laith, through Baghdad. The precision of ser-guided bombs and cruise missiles could be seen without difficulty. From a distance some buildings which had been hit looked almost unharmed; only at close range did I realise that the frame was intact but the inside destroyed. Where the 2,000-lb bombs had impacted on the General Intelligence building near the UN offices, the picture was different. Here the bombs had left more immediately visible damage. Once this building was so close to our own, the impact of such a powerful device felt like an earthquake. The Canal Hotel was shaking and so were we when this particular government building was attacked.

After another night of heavy bombing of targets in Baghdad and sleeplessness, it took several hours during the morning to assign 300 staff to the six buses. We had to prepare accurate lists of who was sitting in which vehicle and who would remain. The Jordanian authorities at the rebel border crossing had agreed to process the entry of this large international group on the basis of these lists. The buses were finally on their way at about 9.30 A.M., leaving behind the twenty-eight colleagues which I had identified as 'essential' staff. These were the UN doctor, members of the security management team, colleagues from various administrative services, the UN security guards unit, and a few others. This evacuation exercise went smoothly with one serious exception: totally against the rules, two senior colleagues with their families decided to quietly leave the UN compound while the evacuation exercise was underway and use their official vehicles to drive on their own to Amman. This was an unfortunate sign of dangerous indiscipline. It delayed the departure of the convoy until we had established mobile telephone links with the prematurely departed colleagues and could adjust our lists accordingly.

As soon as the buses left the Canal compound, the hustle and bustle that had prevailed when there was a full house gave way to a calming silence. In the early afternoon of 18 December, UN colleagues in Amman called us to give us the good news that after a gruelling eighteen-hour overland journey the six buses had safely reached the Jordanian capital. Many hours

had been spent at the border. The lists which the Jordan immigration authorities had asked us to prepare to facilitate easy entry had apparently made little difference.

Around the same time Secretary-General Kofi Annan contacted us. "Thank you for holding out. I appreciate very much what all of you are doing to keep the UN flag flying high. Please convey my best wishes to everyone, including our Iraqi staff." This call was a morale booster which came at a good time. On a more personal note, the UN Secretary-General wanted to know from me whether he had fulfilled his promise to give me a more exciting assignment than the one which I had had in Geneva. Now it was my turn to laugh since his question was a reference to our accidental meeting half a year earlier when I saw him in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva. He had asked me then whether I enjoyed my assignment as Director of the UNDP European Office and I told him that I found it boring!

After four days of Operation Desert Fox the damage to our building, fortunately, was minor. Some windows had been shattered and four of our rooftop water tanks were leaking since they had developed cracks, probably due to the bombs that were dropped on the Am Al Amn building a few hundred meters away and the resulting air pressure. Besides wanting to assess the damage to buildings, I was anxious to get a sense of human casualties. In fact, after each night of bombing I drove to various parts of Baghdad in the mornings to visit the Al Yarmuk and Al Jumhuriyah hospitals as well as to Medinat al Tib, Baghdad's medical city. I wanted to see the wards where bomb victims were being treated. These wards were pitiful sights of civilian suffering, with doctors and nurses trying their best to save the lives of badly hurt civilians. Such images are hard to forget. There were two young men in one of the wards with open burn wounds; protective gauze and strong pain killers were not available. In their painful condition they sat upright in their beds, hoping that in spite of the scant medication they had been given a healing process could begin.

Outside the same hospital, on the morning of 18 December, I passed a young man wearing a sweatshirt depicting a large star-spangled banner, the US flag, on his chest. Inside the hospital were victims of the US bombing, outside a display of the national flag of the country that had just attacked Iraq. I wondered how people in my own country would have reacted under similar circumstances. Again and again I came across this remarkable ability of Iraqis to make a distinction between a country and its policies and its people, goods, symbols and music. Some time later a high-school student in Baghdad was asked where he would like to go if he could travel. He spontaneously replied 'to the United States to hear a Dr Dre concert'.

Damage to civilian areas had been limited since only a few of the missiles and bombs had gone astray. Nevertheless, over two hundred

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Iraqi men, women and children had lost their lives; figures of military casualties were never made available. Apart from signalling a more aggressive Iraq policy, 'Operation Desert Fox' had achieved little in Iraq, except to add a further dose of trauma to the Iraqi people. As Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister had indicated to me when the bombing started, the Government indeed seemed well prepared for the strikes. The seventy buildings belonging to the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the military industrial complex, intelligence services, the Republican Guards and the Ba'ath Party had been emptied of their furniture, files, equipment and staff. The missiles destroyed little more than abandoned buildings.

I had witnessed these preparations. Before Operation Desert Fox on 16 December, after my visit to Tariq Aziz, I drove to the Foreign Ministry to see Ambassador Adnan Malik who was responsible for the multilateral department, to discuss the possibilities of a UN evacuation and what steps the Government intended to take to keep the Oil-for-Food programme operational. As I entered the building, I saw workmen carrying cartons of books, files, tables, chairs, TV sets and other office items to waiting trucks. The Ministry was preparing for the evening. CNN had been useful since it had repeated over and over again regulations that Washington was about to attack Iraq. While the people could not view CNN but only controlled programmes broadcast by the three Iraqi TV news channels, senior officials in all ministries had their individual TV sets with access to CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera and other international channels. Many ministers had two TV sets in their offices. Trade Minister Mohammed Mehdi Saleh and Education Minister Dr Ahmad Al Shagra, for example, had both sets switched on simultaneously, watching BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera whenever I visited them. The Iraqi leadership was in little doubt about the seriousness of the situation, and the Iraqi people were no less so since the streets of Baghdad were full of rumours. Downtown traffic was worse than usual. Al Karade, Al Rashid, Al Adamiya and, of course, Sadoun Street were crowded with people who hurried through the markets to stock up on essentials and to hear the latest news.

During the period of air-strikes I convened daily meetings with staff who had stayed behind. It was important that there should be good communication among us. When I told them that the Secretary-General had called to enquire about their welfare, I could see from their faces how much they appreciated this gesture. We were all proud to have such a compassionate Secretary-General.

On the surface, conditions in Baghdad appeared fairly normal during the daytime; at night it was quite a different picture. The streets, usually full with vehicles as soon as the sun had set, were suddenly deserted and an uneasy silence lay over the city. Stories abounded about the feelings of

Baghdad's citizens during these difficult days. There was the family in Al Mansur who had seen better days before the embargo. The holy month of Ramadan had started and they invited me for 'Iftar', the breaking of the fast after sunset.⁸ After dinner the teenage daughter suddenly asked her parents whether she could play some pieces of music on the piano. She played classical European music with great skill and passion. When she finished she looked at me with her big, brown eyes and said 'when the bombs came, I went to my piano and played to hear only my music, not the explosions'.

Then there was Dr Sadik Alwash, the Head of the Iraqi Red Crescent, who recounted how his daughter would go to their living room each time the bombing started and sit in the middle of the room, covering herself and his granddaughter with a big piece of cloth 'to create a tent and within it a little world of peace for her and her child'.

At lunchtime on 19 December, after the third night of bombing, I looked out of my office and saw on the other side of the fence a young, emaciated looking Iraqi soldier wearing a torn uniform. He was one of the 159 men who kept vigil for us throughout the crisis. He was praying, putting his head on the hot, hard cement floor in deference to his god. It was the *thuhur* or midday prayer, the second of the five daily prayers. At this moment I felt very humble.

There was no public reaction to the few of us who had remained at the UN compound in Baghdad. This happened despite Iraqi radio and the one TV station that was still functioning condemning the US/UK bombings in vitriolic language and criticising what they called 'Butler, the dog' and the United Nations for having facilitated Operation Desert Fox. I was not sure whether the public mood could alter and become more aggressive, or possibly be made more aggressive by the Iraqi authorities. This prompted me to step outside my authority for a brief moment: I asked the UN administrative officer to remove two prominent signs, one displayed at the gate, the other over the entrance to the Canal Hotel offices. In bold lettering both signs identified the 'United Nations Special Commission' (UNSCOM), the disarmament unit, as one of the UN entities housed in this complex. Since UNSCOM was a focus of Iraqi anger, I felt that these signs might attract violence.

It was not long before I realised that I had taken a wrong decision. According to the UN Security Council, UNSCOM was still in existence. No one but the Council had the authority to remove UNSCOM 'insignia'. The next morning I asked the same colleagues who had removed the signs the day before to quickly put them back. This they did immediately but not, however, without smirks on their faces.

⁸ Ramadan had started on 20 December, a day after 'Operation Desert Fox' ended.

vertheless, both the Iraqi Press and the relatively small international press corps in Baghdad had noticed my sign tampering. References to appeared in some of their articles. New York, usually quick in getting to whatever the UN in Baghdad was doing, kept silent. The unified reprimand never came.

Contact with New York throughout the four days of Desert Fox was continuous and mainly concerned with the security situation in Baghdad. There were no UN international staff in any other location during this od. Contact with Iraqi authorities was kept to an absolute minimum. knew that they had little time for us; they probably felt, that incided as we were at the UN Canal Hotel, we could look after selves. This we did with difficulty since we did not know for how long would have to face this crisis.

During the day we received damage reports from Iraqi and other res. We knew that some schools, health facilities, and ministerial dings such as the Ministry of Health, had been hit. Among ourselves was spent discussing how we could assist in the days following the tary strikes. This kept us occupied and ultimately helped speed up the ial 'clean-up' programmes that UNICEF, WHO, UNOCHI and others old carry out in cooperation with NGOs who had also remained in These included the French Première Urgence and Enfants du Monde, International, the Italian Bridge to Baghdad, the Middle East Council hurches and, of course, the ICRC and the IFRC. The UN worked well all of them.

We discovered on 20 December that the previous night had been our night of fear. On that last evening, as on each previous one, my sian UNIKOM colleague stood with me for long moments outside the ance of our building and looked at the illuminated night sky. He ained with great patience to the layman the spectacle over Baghdad. pointed out, for example, that what looked to me like uncoordinated works were, in fact, Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries. 'They have no chance it any of the incoming scuds and other missiles', he told me. The US UK aircraft dropped their ordnance from high altitudes: No hope for Iraqis to shoot one down'. In any case, the remnants of the once ectable Iraqi air force wisely gave way to such superior technology remained on the ground throughout the four nights of military rations. The Iraqi generals knew they could only lose against such hty opponents. It was, nevertheless, quite a spectacle over the dad night skies.

In international television screens it looked far more serious and all racing than it actually was. The families of UN staff serving in dad, including mine in Geneva, were naturally deeply worried. e all relieved when the news reached us in the morning of 20 ember that Operation Desert Fox was over at last. US Secretary of

Defence, William Cohen, had made an announcement to this effect at a news briefing pointing out that 'Saddam Hussein's ability to deliver chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had been degraded.'⁹

Again, the UN Secretary-General acted wisely and swiftly. He ordered those UN staff we had evacuated to Jordan to return immediately to Iraq to resume their duties. Those of us who had stayed behind hardly had time to reconver our 'bunker' building back into offices before the six buses reappeared at the gates of the UN offices at the Canal Hotel. This time it was an arrival accompanied by smiles and obvious relief rather than the departure filled with tears and fear.


Operation Desert Fox had become part of history. For a long time, however, these painful days in December of 1998 remained in our collective memory. We debated what this unilateral episode of air-strikes had actually achieved. Years later, Robin Cook, the then former British Foreign Secretary indicated during a conversation with me that Desert Fox, in his opinion, had been of 'limited significance'. Cook added that he had pressed the British military to give evidence of the destruction of WMD facilities. 'I did not get a satisfactory answer.'

Of course, buildings had been destroyed in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. These had to be rebuilt at a cost to the Iraqi people and to the international community. Schools and hospitals had to be repaired with funds provided by the NGO community and the UN system from their regular (non-Iraqi oil revenue) resources. This money could have been spent on humanitarian programmes. The energy and time of Iraqi and international personnel had to be invested in the post-strike clean-up rather than in helping to run the Oil-for-Food Programme. For weeks senior UN staff were involved in these repair efforts on a daily basis.¹⁰ In addition to the physical damage, there was the shock effect of the heavy strikes on the minds of the Iraqi people. As WHO, UNICEF, IPPNW, Caritas the ICRC and many others had repeatedly observed and reported, the Iraqi population had been under extraordinary stress for many years as a result of the dictatorship and the punitive sanctions programme. Operation Desert Fox was a 'stress bonus'.

How much, we wondered at the UN in Baghdad, could a people take? US/UK air-strikes against Iraq, as an international issue of concern, were

9. US Department of Defence, News Briefing, 19 December 1998.

10. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur at the time, Max van der Stoel, erroneously reported that no damage assessment by the UN in Baghdad had been allowed, 'especially any direct or collateral damage to facilities of the UN Office for the Iraq Programme (OIPY). First of all, there were only very minor damages to our premises. Secondly, the Government did allow UN/NGO assessments of damages to civilian facilities. What Iraqi authorities did not want was an assessment of total damage as they feared that this would have intelligence value: (see: E/CN.4/1999/37, 26 February 1999, p. 9).



Map 3.1 The Northern and Southern No-fly Zones

Source: Country boundary data from Digital Chart of the World 1:1,000,000 digital data. Prepared by NIMA (US Military) and publicly available from <http://www.maproom.psu.edu/dcaw/>.

'Enlarged rules of engagement' abruptly ended the period of mere 'over-flight reassurance' for Kurds and Shi'ites and converted most of the areas in these two no-fly zones into combat areas, places of 'destabilisation' and 'destruction'. The pilots were increasingly free to determine their actions and where to strike. The new policy had little to do with the original pretension of protecting ethnic and religious groups. The containment policy of the United States during the last days of the Clinton administration had begun to crumble and under the incoming administration of George W. Bush in January 2001 was speedily substituted by an aggressive 'regime replacement policy'.

ickly put aside by most governments and a large part of the public. This was not so within the UN community in Iraq. We remained utterly aware that the United Nations had been sidelined, that the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General had been left out of the decision-making process and international law had been discarded and broken. The UN, as a conflict resolution and peace-building institution, had been further weakened. More Iraqis had died.

On 26 December 1998, the Government of Iraq announced that following 'Operation Desert Fox', UNSCOM would no longer be allowed to return its arms inspectors to Iraq.¹¹ The US/UK Governments indicated that they had adopted 'enlarged rules of engagement' in the no-fly zones, giving the pilots of their air forces greater freedom of action. This would significantly alter the security situation in large parts of the country. A first sign of what was to come was the attack on an Iraqi ti-aircraft base near the city of Mosul on 28 December 1998, nine days after the end of Operation Desert Fox. Baghdad, Washington and London continued to climb the ladder of confrontation.

The two no-fly zones had been established by the US, the UK and French governments in 1991/92 to implement 'Operation Provide Comfort' in northern Iraq north of the 36th parallel and 'Operation Southern Watch' in the south of the 32nd parallel.¹² The three governments maintaining these no-fly zones argued at the time that this would help to protect the Kurdish population in the north and the Shi'ite population in the south against attacks by Saddam Hussein's air force.

Travelling in Iraqi Kurdistan in late November/early December 1998, I witnessed the daily afternoon visits by US and UK aircraft flying at high altitudes in the northern no-fly zone. After a few over flights in the Shukuk, Erbil and Suleimaniyah areas and the repeated breaking of the no-barrier to remind everyone that they were in the area, they would return to the Incirlik airbase in south-eastern Anatolia. The Turkish government had assigned this base to US and UK forces for this purpose. One could almost set one's watch by this display of presence. It would beat itself day after day at exactly the same time in the afternoons. The pattern was similar in the southern no-fly zone. The incursions into Iraq's space prior to the air-strikes of December 1998 had been as benign as Iraq's reaction.

The US/UK Governments and much of the media, the latter either innocently or deliberately, later reported that the Government of Iraq had 'expelled' the UNSCOM arms inspectors. The fact is that they were voluntarily withdrawn by UNSCOM on 16 December 1998, the day 'Operation Desert Fox' began. In 1996 the southern no-fly zone was extended to include areas up to the 33rd parallel.

The key manifestation of this new policy in the no-fly zones was the destabilisation of conditions in Iraq. The official US/UK explanation for air attacks on Iraqi targets under these enlarged rules of engagement was always the same: US and UK pilots flying their protective missions in the no-fly zones had been locked into Iraqi radar screens, thereby endangering the safety of the pilots. In the words of the US State Department: 'The air strikes are not targeted at the Iraqi people. They are the direct response for self-defence of the forces that protect the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south from the regime's civilian repression'.¹³ What the State Department did not disclose was that each time the US/UK air forces crossed into Iraq it was no longer by a lone plane that made its rounds over the Kurdish north and the Shia south. The operation had become an armada of electronic jamming planes, tornado fighter bombers, jaguar attack planes, F-15s and F-16s and refuelling tankers, all assisted by AWACs on watch in the border areas.

Over-flight reminders in Iraq of a coalition presence in neighbouring countries before December 1998 did have reassurance value. In Erbil, I was told that people in Iraqi Kurdistan welcomed this 'aerial reassurance' of their international protection. I assume that similar sentiments existed in the Shia south. The 'protective' value of the presence of the US and UK air forces, however, was doubtful. It was more a case of appeasement of critical governments and the international public who were increasingly less convinced of the justification of having no-fly zones in the first place. Until there were civilian casualty reports of US/UK air-strikes, the issue of legality of the no-fly zones and what was happening there was rarely evoked in the international discussion on Iraq.

Grunesome pictures of mangled bodies of civilians and destroyed schools, rural health centres and warehouses alerted members of the UN Security Council, parliaments, anti-war and anti-sanctions movements around the world, as well as the UN community in Iraq. The US State Department's spokesman in 1999–2000, James P. Rubin,¹⁴ repeatedly tried to justify these air-strikes by stating that 'the purpose of the no-fly zones is to prevent Iraq from using its airspace to kill and maim its own citizens'.¹⁵ A few months later he claimed: 'They [the US/UK aircraft] never target civilians or civilian facilities ... these aircraft ... are carrying out a humanitarian mission ...'.¹⁶

13. The US State Department, Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, 'Myth and Facts about Iraq', August 2000, p. 5.

14. James P. Rubin was the US State Department's Spokesperson when Madeleine Albright served as Secretary of State. In 2004 Rubin was Foreign Policy Advisor to Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry.

15. US Department of State, Daily Press Briefings, 29 February 2000.

16. See Washington Post, 'US Defends Air Strikes in Iraq's No-Fly Zones', 17 June 2000, A.M.

The governments in Riyadh and Ankara became increasingly uneasy about the US/UK shift from benign takeover of Iraqi airspace to an intensifying confrontation between Iraqi ground forces and coalition air forces. The Saudi and Turkish Governments kept reminding Washington and London that their airbases were available but for 'peaceful' rather than 'hostile' forays into their neighbour's territory. Ankara was particularly concerned, repeatedly reminding the US/UK command at Incirlik airbase that they did not want to see an escalation in the no-fly zones of Iraq.¹⁷

It should be remembered that the US/UK air forces had begun flying under enlarged rules of engagement'. There were a few who thought that the US/UK air forces were deliberately 'targeting civilians'. There were many who doubted the 'humanitarian mission', and there was an increasing number of Iraq watchers who began to ask the key questions: whose 'rules' were these 'enlarged rules' following and what was the legality of the no-fly zones?

The US and UK Governments tried to avoid a discussion of these questions in and outside of the UN Security Council. When pressed for a position, they invariably would make the general contention that existing UN resolutions had already given them the authority to maintain the two no-fly zones and that they were acting in self-defence. If this did not satisfy the enquirers, they would refer to a string of UN resolutions which, in their opinion, gave them mandate and legality.

The resolution, evoked more than any other by the two Governments, is UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991. This resolution, in article 5, requests the UN Secretary-General 'to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population' and appeals to member States 'to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts'.¹⁸ There is no reference anywhere in this resolution that would empower member States 'to take forceful measures like those necessarily associated with the establishment and enforcement of no-fly zones'.¹⁹ This short

17. These observations are based on numerous conversations the author had in 1999/2000 with Turkish diplomats in Baghdad.

18. See UNS/RES 688 (1991), 5 April 1991. This resolution, it is important to point out, was adopted by the UN Security Council, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This chapter deals with 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and not Chapter VII, which is entitled 'Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace and Acts of Aggression' and includes article 42. This article gives the Security Council the right to take 'action by land, air, sea ... as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'. All other key resolutions on Iraq make specific reference to Chapter VII. See also UN Charter, pp. 24–8.

19. See Rex J. Zedalis, 'The Quiet, Continuing Air War Against Iraq: An Interpretive Analysis of the Controlling Security Council Resolutions', in *Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, 2000, p. 188.

solution has not even implicit references to a military protection role, let one the use of force in these two areas of Iraq. It only deals with the UN's role in meeting specific humanitarian needs in Iraq. UK Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock was out of order when he stated in the UN Security Council that 'the action we take in the no-fly zones is following Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), to protect the civilian population of Iraq from repression by the Iraqi Government'.²⁰ Other Security Council resolutions referred to by the US and UK governments as legitimisation²¹ also contain no enabling wording for the establishment of the two no-fly zones, and certainly not for the type of engagement perpetuated by the coalition air force in the zones. Resolutions such as 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), both passed under chapter I of the UN Charter, did contain such phrases as 'use all necessary means'²² and 'take further steps as may be required to secure peace and security in the region'.²³ The former, however, relates only to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; wording of the latter was incorrectly, and without legal base, taken by the US and UK Governments as an indirect consent of the UN Security Council to do anything that they thought would 'secure peace and security'. This included the delineation of no-fly zones and the offensive acts which were increasingly carried out by their air forces.

It is more than doubtful that this is what the Security Council had in mind when it passed Resolution 687. Had the UN Security Council been of the opinion that strong measures should be included, as foreseen in chapter VII of the UN Charter, should be included they would have done so. In the subsequent Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, for example, in which the Council referred to a 'material breach of its (Iraq's) obligations' and that 'Iraq ... will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations ...',²⁴ this was done. Had the Council wanted to establish no-fly zones, it could have included a specific reference in Resolution 688 or in any other Iraq resolution. The Council, however, had no such intentions. Throughout the years the no-fly zones were not a standard topic of the Iraq debate by the Security Council. They, however, were raised periodically by various permanent and non-permanent members who questioned the legality of the zones and the attacks that were carried out by the air forces of the US and the UK. While such references were made, the Council regrettably never discussed the zones. Nevertheless, at no time did the Security Council even implicitly support the existence of the no-fly zones. In 1999 the Russian representative, Ambassador Granovski, pressed his Government's position very clearly when he said: 'we

²⁰ UN/S/4152nd meeting, S/PV.4152, 8 June 2000, p. 4.

²¹ For example, Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991).

²² See UN S/Res 678 (1990), 29 November 1990, para. 2.

²³ See UN S/Res 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, para. 34.

²⁴ See UN S/Res (2002), 8 November 2002, paras. 1 and 13.

condemn in particular the continuing aerial bombing of Iraqi civilian and military facilities by the United States and the United Kingdom under the illegal pretext of the no-fly zones which were created unilaterally in circumvention of the Security Council.' Throughout the years other governments have echoed this Russian position in the Security Council. Ambassador Babaa, representing the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libyan Government) at the United Nations, criticised the Security Council during an open meeting on Iraq on 28 June 2001, saying that it 'had not even initiated a debate of [the no-fly zones] which flagrantly violate[s] international law ...'.²⁵ On the same occasion, India's Deputy Permanent Representative Satyprata Pal reiterated this position by pointing out that 'the no-fly zones are not sanctioned by any aspect of the Council's resolutions'.²⁶

The Government of Iraq, of course, did not restrain its anger over the existence of the no-fly zones. During a February 2001 visit to UN headquarters, Foreign Minister Mohamed Al Sahaf told Kofi Annan that 'the United States and the United Kingdom bear the full international responsibility for their illegal actions' and submitted a detailed statement on the no-fly zone to the United Nations.²⁷

The Iraqi Press made news about the 'US/UK evil crows' and their armed sorties into Iraq a standard piece of reporting. Whenever civilian sites had been hit, Iraq and the US/UK would engage in another battle, a 'battle of words'. The Iraqis would accuse, the US/UK would refute. For example, Iraq claimed that a warehouse in Southern Iraq that had been destroyed contained food supplies, but the US/UK Governments insisted that it had held anti-aircraft weapons.

In the UN offices in Baghdad, we read these news items and were confused since we were not able to verify the reporting. Following Operation Desert Fox, the frequency of incursions into Iraqi airspace increased. I was determined to better understand this emerging security issue. For me this was not only an issue of general concern. It had implications for the security of a large number of UN staff who were using Iraqi roads while overseeing the Oil-for-Food Programme and was endangering the lives of Iraqi civilians living in these areas.

Given my responsibilities for the security of UN staff in Iraq, I discussed the enhanced security risks with Abraham Mathai, the Chief of the Security Unit in the UNOCHI office and his staff. There was unanimity among us that we had to create a much more reliable information base than the one we were given by the national and international media. We

²⁵ UN Security Council, S/PV.4336, 4336th meeting, 28 June 2001, p. 2.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁷ See 'Presentation of the Delegation of the Republic of Iraq in the Dialogue with the Secretary-General of the United Nations', New York, 26–7 February 2001, pp. 31–41.

nted to devise a format for the collection of data concerning incidents in the no-fly zones. This would entail keeping a record of the air-strikes reported by the Iraqi media, with full awareness that they may contain some inflated information. At the end of December 1998, all UN staff working in Iraq were instructed to include, as part of their back-to-office reports, air-strike information which they could obtain at the locations where they worked and, of course, report on air-strikes they themselves witnessed.

Under the leadership of the UN Security Office in Baghdad, visits to selected air-strike sites were organised to verify what we read in the local media or heard from Iraqi Ministry of Defence spokespersons. Quarterly reports and a consolidated annual report were to be issued. This information in turn would be analysed to see whether we could uncover any patterns in the timing and frequency of allied sorties involving incidents in civilian areas and to estimate the extent of civilian damage. Mathai and I agreed that we would then determine what the implications, if any, would be for the movement of UN personnel in Iraq. We soon realised that there was no pattern, but security incidents of a kind occurring before Operation Desert Fox became a repeated aspect of life in Iraq. This was a worrying development for Iraqis and foreigners alike. The air-strike report²⁸ which we eventually prepared and forwarded to the UN Security Coordinator in New York and the Office of the UN Secretary-General showed that in 1999 air-strikes occurred on average on the third day. Basrah in the South and Mosul in the North and their environs received the maximum of strikes, with thirty-three killed in the emirate of Basrah and fifty-seven in the governorate of Nineva (Mosul). There was also damage to private houses, vehicles and civilian government buildings including a warehouse, a primary school, and a

mosque, as well as livestock in sixty-four different locations. These UN air-strike reports led to considerable acrimony within the UN secretariat. While individual members of the UN Security Council used these reports extensively to argue the case against the no-fly zones, the UN secretariat was split over whether I, as the UN Security Coordinator in Iraq, had the right to produce such documents. The UN Security Coordinator and Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme, Benon Sevan, was outraged that I had decided to produce such reports.

The Chef de Cabinet, Iqbal Riza, wrote to me that these air-strike reports were 'very interesting and useful' for the Secretary-General's Office and should be continued.³⁰ There could be no doubt that this information was relevant for the UN team in Iraq and our humanitarian mission, as it allowed us to take protective measures for staff and humanitarian supplies. We decided, for example, that UN staff on duty travel outside of Baghdad had to return to the capital or specified nodal points elsewhere in the country by nightfall. UN staff resident in the locations of Bastrah, Kirkuk and Mosul were withdrawn following continued heavy air-strikes there. We also halted UN truck traffic between Mosul and Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan between the hours of 11 o'clock in the morning and 3 o'clock in the afternoon because air-strikes tended to occur in this area during those hours. We became more sensitive to staff welfare by allowing staff members who were apprehensive about their safety while outside Baghdad to remain in the capital.

As the security value of the incident database and the air-strike reports became well established and the Secretary-General's Office welcomed the reporting, I was convinced that the UN in Baghdad was correct in continuing our record-keeping of this unfortunate situation. We issued the second quarterly report in July 1999. Shortly thereafter I travelled to New York and London for consultations and briefings on the Iraq situation.

Soon after my arrival in New York I received a message from the UK mission to the United Nations that Ambassador Stewart Eldon wanted to see me. I assumed he was interested in hearing the latest from Iraq and discussing the status of the Oil-for-Food Programme. Accompanied by another member of the UK mission, Eldon met me at the UN Secretariat.

He quickly came to the point and did not mince his words: 'Why are you compiling these no-fly zone reports? Do you realise that you are totally straying off your mandate? As the UN Humanitarian Coordinator you have no business dealing with issues outside your area of competence! In any case, all you are doing is putting a UN logo of approval on Iraqi propaganda.' Following this vehement introduction, Ambassador Eldon then conveyed with pride that he knew what he was talking about since he

I number of air strikes (days)	132	Total number of air strikes with civilian casualties (days)	56
civilian deaths	144	No. civilian injuries	446
Northern no-fly zone	57	Northern no-fly zone	133
Southern no-fly zone	87	Southern no-fly zone	313

le 3.1 Iraq's No-Fly Zones US/UK Air Strikes (28 December 1998 – 31 December 1999)²⁹

rc: Confidential report prepared by UNOCHI/Baghdad entitled 'Air Strikes in Reported Civilian Casualties and Damages, 28 December 1998 – 31 December 1999'. Confidential report prepared by UNOCHI/Baghdad entitled, 'Air Strikes in Reported Civilian Casualties and Damages, 28 December 1998–31 December 1999'.

30. Internal fax from S. Iqbal Riza, Chef de Cabinet to the author, dated 18 May 1999.

had been a Deputy Manager of Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 war against Iraq. 'You should know that British Intelligence received information in the early 1990s that Iraqi agents were planning to travel in Europe in possession of lethal substances.' Why did he tell me all this? It did not fit at all into the context of our 'no-fly encounter'.³¹

Eldon had walked across from the Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza on Second Avenue to tell me what the UN should not do in Iraq rather than discuss with me what the UK could do to help in improving the human conditions in Iraq. I was disappointed but not entirely surprised. After all, a representative of a government which year after year invested its energies in the Security Council in maintaining the status quo, preventing dialogue and only as a last resort giving in to pressures for long overdue improvements in the economic sanctions regime and the Oil-for-Food Programme could not be expected to be eager to discuss ways in which sanction policies were implemented, especially with someone as critical of British sanctions policy as he knew I was. When he had finished his litany of rebukes, I told him that UN security staff, UN observers travelling in areas where air-strikes had taken place or I myself would verify what the Iraq News Agency (INA) and others had written. I gave him the example of a cruise missile which had struck the Al-Jumhuriya residential area of Basrah on 25 January 1999 when US/UK bombers were concurrently attacking Abu Flos in the Shatt-El-Arab, Abu al-Kaseeb south of Basrah, the infamous Al-Rumeila oil fields and Basrah airport. Iraqi media had spoken of eleven casualties, many injured and rows of houses destroyed. 'I had travelled to the area, Ambassador Eldon and could confirm the destruction of houses in this poor neighbourhood of Basrah and in Abu Kaseeb'. I mentioned to Eldon that Mathai, my Chief of Security, and I had spoken to residents who described to us their losses and told us of the many injured relatives and neighbours. 'We counted a total of seventeen coffins Ambassador Eldon, not eleven, as reported by the media. Iraqi propaganda?'³²

Eldon's response: 'We regret any civilian casualty but our pilots act only in self defence. The Iraqi military installs itself in civilian residential areas. Incidents are often caused by the Iraqi armed forces.' Considering this, I decided to say no more. It would have made no difference except to harden his resolve.³³ In any case, he repeated that I should refrain from writing such reports. For him they were out of order. For me they were evidence of serious wrongdoing.

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While I spoke with Ambassador Eldon his assistant was engrossed in recording what was being said. The minutes of this meeting could not possibly have been flattering to the UN Security Coordinator in Baghdad. I did not mind: I wanted it to be known that I was not succumbing to unjustified pressure; the United Nations had a responsibility to keep such records.

The conversation ended fairly abruptly when I reminded Ambassador Eldon that I reported to the UN Secretary-General and not to the British Government and would, therefore, continue to monitor the no-fly zone incidents until instructed by the UN otherwise.

Perhaps I should have also told Eldon of the attack in the spring of 1999 by US/UK planes on a shepherd's family – the Jarjees family near Qurban village, 30 km from Mosul. The shepherd, six members of his family and 101 sheep were killed, and a water bowser and a vehicle destroyed. I will never forget the stench that hung over the wide, open plain in April temperatures of 40°C³⁴ at the time of my visit there. Nor will I forget the immense sadness on the faces of those who showed us around. The human bodies had been removed. The mangled carcasses of sheep lay where they had been struck.

The US/UK military described this incident quite differently:³⁵ '30th April 1999 ... Operation Northern Watch aircraft were fired upon by Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery. Responding in self defence, US air force F-15E strike eagles and F-16C falcons dropped GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on Iraqi radar and anti-aircraft artillery sites south and northeast of Mosul. In addition, US air force F-16CJ falcons launched AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) at Iraqi radar and anti-aircraft artillery sites south and northeast of Mosul.'³⁴ Referring to this incident, Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary at the time, said to me five years later: 'I cannot understand how the US air force could not distinguish between an anti-aircraft facility and a shepherd's grazing ground. Yes, the US committed a lot of blunders' in the no-fly zones.³⁵

USEUCOM did not even acknowledge this horrendous error. Truth was again sacrificed in order not to invite renewed criticism by many who felt that the US and UK Governments were acting illegally and brutally in maintaining the two no-fly zones.

The continuing air-strike reporting and the fact that I had not given in to Ambassador Eldon's intimidation efforts undoubtedly contributed to a build-up of the determination by the Foreign Office in London and the

³¹ John Pilger in his article 'The Secret War on Iraq', quoted NATO Secretary-General George Robertson who in 1999, as the British Minister of Defence, had remarked: 'We have to continue making these air strikes in order to carry on with our humanitarian work'.

³² This incident happened on 30 April 1999.

³³ Statement by the US European Command (USEUCOM) near Stuttgart in Germany.

³⁴ See www.eucom.mil.

³⁵ Meeting with Robin Cook, former British Foreign Secretary, in Brighton, 29 September 2004.

tate Department in Washington to encourage Kofi Annan to get rid of his abstinate UN official in Baghdad.

A few months later, in the autumn of 1999, on another visit from Baghdad to New York, I was made acutely aware of this. It was Wednesday, 27 October, when the Secretary-General received me in his office with the words: 'Are you aware that the US and UK Governments have asked me for your removal?' I replied in the affirmative since I had heard this from a colleague the evening before and as a consequence had assed a night full of reflection. The Secretary-General then looked straight at me and said: 'Your contract is hereby renewed.'³⁶ Vindication? , strong and principled Secretary-General? Relief? All of these came to my mind at this moment, but more than anything there was a feeling of ride to work with such a Secretary-General. 'Go and see the British and US Ambassadors. This will help', Kofi Annan suggested to me. I did, even though I was not convinced that it would. There did not seem any room or US/UK policy adjustment. Facts from Iraq were not needed. nportant for them was that a UN official in their opinion had stepped ut of line, did not see the bigger picture, constituted a nuisance, was not competent for the job.

Ambassadors Greenstock and Burleigh received me in a friendly way. We exchanged views on Iraq. I mentioned to both that UN no-fly zones sporting was done out of security concerns and not to antagonise their overnments. I thought I had found at least some understanding by both mbassadors. This was apparently not the case since a short while later I received a note in Baghdad from Chef de Cabinet Iqbal Riza to tell me that both 'had reiterated their concerns' after our meetings.³⁷

At this October 1999 meeting with Secretary-General Annan we spoke ot so much about the no-fly zones as about the management of the umanitarian programme and my involvement with the media, another ource of US/UK irritation. He advised me, in his gentle way, to refrain om criticising Security Council policies, 'even if you think there is stified cause to do so', and 'confine yourself to outlining to the press the actual situation in Iraq as you perceive it'. Kofi Annan was right. But for UN staff having to represent Security Council policies in Baghdad and to ee the human consequences of such policies on the ground was quite nother matter.

The northern no-fly zone only partially covered Iraqi Kurdistan, the ea that the zone allegedly was meant to protect. Parts of Suleimaniyah overnorate, including its capital, were below the 36th parallel and, herefore, outside this 'protection zone'. Why the coalition governments o decided remains a mystery. In the areas of the northern no-fly zone

which were under the control of Saddam Hussein's Government, the security situation under 'enlarged rules of engagement' had progressively worsened. Insecurity in the Baghdad-held areas was predominately due to air-strikes. It was also less complex here than in the Kurdish areas across the line of control. Soon after the Gulf War ended on 28 February 1991 and members of the UN Security Council had agreed 'to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible'³⁸ Kurdish leaders sought international protection for their people. They feared that Saddam Hussein would repeat in Iraqi Kurdistan what he had done in the Shia South. There he had ruthlessly quelled resistance to his regime and to initiatives for local autonomy. After the enormous suffering of the 1980s, which was symbolised most dramatically by the carnage of the 1988 Anfal campaign, the Kurds were frightened.

Many left towns and villages and took to the rugged mountains of northern Iraq. A good number crossed into the Kurdish areas of Eastern Turkey and Syria. In 1991, the US/UK initiated 'Operation Provide Comfort', involving a large multinational defence force³⁹ that entered Northern Iraq, constituted the immediate response to reassure Iraqi Kurdistan of international protection and provide emergency assistance. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the suppression of opposition in both Southern and Northern Iraq by Saddam Hussein's military and intelligence and the volatile political situation created in the region by the large number of Kurdish refugees in Turkey, Iran and Syria all contributed to international acceptance of the crossing into Iraq by this multinational protection force. The fact that, in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated was ignored. The need to make the return of Kurdish refugees to their homelands in Northern Iraq possible was the immediate priority.

The UN Security Council did not authorise 'Operation Provide Comfort' but debated the security situation for Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq. The Council asked Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to extend help to 'all those in need of assistance'⁴⁰ and report accordingly to the Security Council. Pérez de Cuéllar recognised that the deepening humanitarian crisis in all parts of Iraq called for bold and circumspect measures. In this spirit the UN negotiated, with the Government of Saddam Hussein, the Iraq-wide deployment of United Nations guards. The UN's first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, had already proposed this method in 1945 to protect humanitarian missions in crisis

6. Meeting with UN Secretary-General on 27 October 1999 in New York.
7. Letter from Iqbal Riza, Chef de Cabinet, to me dated 23 November 1999.

38. See UN S/RES/686 (1991), 2 March 1991.

39. There were two 'Operations Provide Comfort', the first ended on 24 July 1991, the second on 31 December 1996.

40. See UN S/RES 688 (1991), 5 April 1991.

areas.⁴¹ The Government of Iraq accepted the presence of a contingent of up to five hundred persons of what became known as the 'United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq' (UNGCI).⁴² Its mission was to protect 'UN personnel, assets and operations linked with the humanitarian programme'.⁴³ These guards, who were authorised to carry sidearms provided by the Iraqi authorities, came from contributing countries' police and military forces.

Over the years the number of these UN guards was not only continuously adjusted downwards at the insistence of the Iraqi authorities but, as of mid-1992, their presence was confined to the three northern (Kurdish) governorates. Their presence in the early 1990s, small as it was, nevertheless helped to facilitate the return and reintegration of Kurdish refugees from neighbouring countries and the distribution of food, medicine and clothing. At the time of the Oil-for-Food Programme, the UNGCI carried out important border-control functions, gave protection to UN civilians travelling in Iraqi Kurdistan in connection with the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme, monitored the general security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan,⁴⁴ performed rescue operations following not infrequent road incidents, and extended medical help to UN and non-UN persons travelling in their command areas.⁴⁵ The white UNGCI four-wheel drive vehicles plying the roads of Northern Iraq were welcomed by the local population as a sign of international concern for their welfare. UN staff,

1. The UN represented by Sadriddin Aga Khan and the Government of Iraq by its Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 18 April 1991 on humanitarian assistance to which six weeks later, on 30 May 1991 an annex was added with details on the deployment of a 'UN guards contingent'. This MOU was replaced on 21 November 1991 by a second memorandum to refine the conditions of UN humanitarian assistance and the terms of the UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI). The first ten guards arrived in May 1991 and were stationed near Zakhlo at the Iraqi-Turkish border in Dohuk governorate. The full complement of five hundred guards, representing thirty-five nationalities, was deployed by October 1991.

2. The Government of Iraq changed its position on the number of guards soon after signing the annex to the April 1991 MOU. In August 1992 the Iraqi authorities insisted on a reduction to 150 guards. At the time of my tenure in Iraq there was a tacit understanding between the UN and Government that no more than sixty-nine guards would be allowed service in the country limited, however, to Iraqi Kurdistan.

3. See UN/Iraq MOU of 21 November 1991 in, 'UN and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-96', UN Department of Public Information, p. 362, para. 7.

4. In 1999, UNGCI conducted 1,695 escorts for UN personnel in the three governorates of Iraqi Kurdistan and carried out 1,494 security patrols – see UNGCI confidential report for 1999, dated 23 January 2000, p. 8.

5. UNGCI officers also assisted the humanitarian programme by placing communication repeater stations and car fuel depots in remote areas of Northern Iraq.

whether permanently assigned to the UN area headquarters of Erbil or Suleimaniyah, or travelling across the northern areas on the Kurdish side of the line of control, were also reassured by the presence of these experienced UN blue-clad security officers – and for good reasons.

The security situation in this part of the country was significantly more volatile than in areas under Baghdad's control. Located in the northern no-fly zone, with the exception of the south-eastern half of Suleimaniyah governorate, the area was outside the zone of direct influence of the Iraqi armed forces. Diplomats, intelligence personnel, foreign military, businessmen, NGO representatives, and even tourists would travel in and out of Iraqi Kurdistan from neighbouring countries without notifying Government and without visas. This free-for-all also made a mockery of UN Security Council resolutions which had consistently emphasised Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The result was that Iraqi Kurdistan became the convenient meeting-ground of foreign intelligence organisations interested in playing the 'great game' in this part of the world.⁴⁶ Matters were further complicated by the fact that the Turkish army maintained a semi-permanent force with armed vehicles and tanks in the Dohuk governorate because of the Turkish Kurdish People's Party operations in the border areas of Turkey and Iraq.⁴⁷ In Suleimaniyah, MIT, the Turkish Intelligence and the Turkish Kurdish People's Party had for some time, in the late 1990s, 'semi-official' representations recognised by the PUK. There is little doubt that Western undercover agents had infiltrated some of the many non-governmental organisations carrying out their humanitarian missions in Iraqi Kurdistan. It was an absurd situation that certainly complicated the implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme and the wider humanitarian exemption in Northern Iraq.

Each time my UN colleagues and I travelled across the line of control into Iraqi Kurdistan it was a trip into uncertainty. On the Kurdish side we were received by UN guards in two UNGCI vehicles, one to head the convoy, the other to provide protection from the rear. Colonel Sethsson, the Swedish chief of the UNGCI and his sixty-eight guards were indeed an important part of our humanitarian mission. Made up of eight nationalities from countries in Asia and Europe,⁴⁸ they were a well

46. MI6, CIA, MOSSAD, MIT, SAVANA, BND and, of course, the Iraqi Intelligence had their presence, if not their stations there.

47. At times there were long spells of absence of Turkish armed forces /PKK encounters. During these periods one could witness, as I did, entrenched Turkish contingents socialising with Kurdish villagers. On one occasion I saw Turkish soldiers in Al Amadiya (Dohuk governorate) playing netball across the barrels of their tanks.

48. As of 31 December 1999 UNGCI included guards from Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Philippines, Greece, Nepal and Poland.

rained, professional and disciplined UN contingent – exactly what was needed under these fluid circumstances.

How unstable the situation was in the very area that the US and UK had designated for special protection and no-fly zones is reflected in the many security incidents that occurred in all three Kurdish governorates north after month. During the first year as Humanitarian Coordinator JNGCI recorded some 350 security-related incidents for Iraqi Kurdistan.⁴⁹ A good number of these had to do with the UN presence in northern Iraq. The UNGCI identified close to forty such incidents involving anti-UN street protests, shooting at UN personnel, vehicles and other property, explosions at UN warehouses, booby traps, rocket attacks, threatening telephone calls to individual UN staff, planting of anti-personnel mines and stone throwing. Several UN staff members lost their lives in these encounters and others were severely wounded.⁵⁰ Bands of Kurdish Isqi Partisi or Kurdish People's Party (PKK) insurgents were seeking temporary refuge in Northern Iraq or had crossed the Turkish/Iraqi border to fight their ethnic brothers from the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) for cooperating with Turkey. They also confronted the Turkish forces stationed in Dohuk, which added significantly to the volatility of the security situation in Iraqi Kurdistan.⁵¹ The introduction by the US/UK Governments of enlarged rules of engagement in 1998 for their air forces in the no-fly zones led not only to steep increases in the number of air-strike incidents in both the southern and northern no-fly zones, but also added a new dimension to the security situation in the northern no-fly zone. Confrontation between the US and British air forces with Iraqi ground forces at times spilled across the line of control into Iraqi Kurdistan. During a February 1999 visit to northern Iraq I witnessed, for example, a series of missile hits in the Dohuk area. The Kurdish authorities accused Baghdad of indiscriminately firing into their areas of control. The Iraqi Government version was different. It argued that the damage was due entirely to foreign aircraft which had entered Iraq illegally. Our report to New York pointed out that 'a total of 33 ground-to-ground artillery shells / missiles (were) known to have hit Dohuk city and areas around six villages spread over approximately 250 square kilometres'.⁵² These shells and missiles were undoubtedly of Iraqi military origin and were intended for the incoming US and UK aircraft.

49. The majority of these took place in Erbil and Dohuk – see confidential UNGCI report for 1995 dated 23 January 2000.

50. Ibid.

51. In 1999 UNGCI identified thirty-nine serious security incidents with many casualties involving the PKK – see UNGCI confidential report for 1999 dated 23 January 2000, pp. 13-1 to C-17.

52. UNOHC1 crypto-fax dated 16 February 1999 to the UN Secretariat on 'Incidents of Missile Hits in the Dohuk Area of Northern Iraq, 2-12 February 1999'.

When they failed to reach their targets they at times fell upon Kurdish autonomous territory, causing more political than physical damage. Deliberately provoked incidents across the line of control did occur but were, fortunately, rare. Sometimes they bordered on the ridiculous: the Iraqi Foreign Ministry requested my presence to protest alleged UN collaboration with Kurds in releasing cobra snakes or planting locust eggs along the line of control. On another occasion, I was asked to instruct my office in Erbil to remove an anti-Saddam Hussein cartoon from the bulletin board. There were also isolated skirmishes between Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish Peshmergas⁵³ and, in Southern Suleimaniyah, outside the no-fly zone, Iraqi air force incursions and attacks in Kurdish-held areas. These, however, were extremely rare since the Iraqi Government knew the implications of sustained provocation in Kurdish areas.⁵⁴ In the late 1990s relations between the KDP and the PUK, the two main Iraqi Kurdish factions, had sufficiently improved. This made confrontation along their internal line of control dividing the governorates of Dohuk and Erbil (KDP) and Suleimaniyah (PUK) rare.

The Kurdish areas of the northern no-fly zone were anything but tranquil. The daily life of Iraqi Kurds and the many foreigners who had come with either honourable or dubious motives faced many uncertainties and dangers. This security reality obviously had its impact on the implementation of humanitarian programmes. These included the nineteen NGOs that were active in Iraqi Kurdistan at the turn of the century, and the UN system with its Oil-for-Food Programme. The nearly daily incidents of varied origin did restrict the freedom with which the humanitarian exemption could be carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The balance sheet for the no-fly zones is not a good one, either for the Iraqi people or for the United Nations. To protect vulnerable groups against a ruthless regime cannot possibly be an objectionable goal. To establish two rigid exclusion zones and make these increasingly the practice ground for waging a war, however, was not the way of achieving this goal.

International monitoring of the human rights situation in Iraq by the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Commission could have constituted an adequate UN early-warning system. Just as the UN Security Council had options for implementing comprehensive economic sanctions which could have reduced the harm to the Iraqi people, the Council had options on how to react to the unilateralist approaches of three of its permanent members in establishing

53. Peshmerga – literal translation from Kurdish = 'those who face death'. For Kurds these are their freedom fighters.

54. On 13 March 1999, for example, two GOI helicopters bombed an empty land cruiser in the Jabari district of new Kirkuk in Suleimaniyah governorate.

the two no-fly zones.⁵⁵ The issue of the no-fly zones, however, was intermittently raised in the Council by individual members but never debated as a specific agenda item by the Security Council as a whole. Never did the Council pronounce the illegality of the existence of these zones; it was simply not a Security Council topic.

As experts continue their discussion over the interpretation of various Security Council resolutions with respect to the legality of the establishment of the no-fly zones, it cannot be argued that Iraq resolutions contained explicit provision for such exclusion zones. They did not. It again points to the weakness of a Council that was willing to overlook the fact that two permanent members had maintained these zones for over ten years without a Council mandate. The implications of this neglect of Security Council responsibility were serious enough in the period leading up to 'Operation Desert Fox' in December 1998. The subsequent introduction by the US and UK Governments of enlarged rules of engagement for their pilots operating in the no-fly zones and their air-strikes resulted in harm imposed on Iraq's civilian population. The Security Council's connivance constituted guilt by omission.

The Security Council had access to the air-strike reports prepared by the United Nations in Iraq, and individual members did use these to present their objections to the strikes.⁵⁶ The Council was aware that it had never authorised these zones and that all three Secretaries-General (de Cuellar, Boutros Ghali and Annan) had referred during their tenure to the problem of the no-fly zones. Yet, the Council did not have the capacity to get 'involved', even when the number of civilian casualties rose steeply in 1999 and during the provocation in 2002/03 of the US and UK air forces. Preparing for the March 2003 war, these air forces could no longer hide their intentions behind the need for self-defence. There were almost daily incursions into Iraqi territory by US and UK air forces and Turkish land forces. This all made a mockery of the Council's repeated reassurance in its Iraq resolutions of the country's right to sovereignty. The Council, as a council, had the obligation to take a clear stand rather than leaving it to a few members of the Council, notably Russia and China, to condemn the zones and the air-strikes. These individual protests made no difference whatsoever at the political level. Surveillance from neighbouring countries and respect for Iraq's land borders rather than air incursions could have prevented the security chaos in Iraqi Kurdistan:

they could have saved lives and facilitated smoother implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme in both the northern and the southern no-fly zones.

Iraq's 1991–2003 no-fly zones constitute a powerful example of a UN Security Council in urgent need of reform, since it was structurally and normatively incapable of withstanding unilateralism and bilateral misuse in the name of the international community.

55. The US, the UK and France, France decided in 1996 to opt out of this coalition.

56. Even though members of the Security Council made use of the UN/Baghdad prepared air-strike reports, none protected the UN designated official for security – nor did the UN Secretariat, which remained silent during harsh and unjustified criticism of his reports. The neutrality of the UN civil service was not defended.

THE IRAQ INQUIRY

First Witness Statement of
Count Hans-Christof von Sponeck

This is the exhibit marked "HVS3" in the first witness statement of Count Hans von Sponeck.

Confidential

AIR STRIKES IN IRAQ &
REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES

28 DECEMBER 1998 - 31 DECEMBER 1999

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

AIR STRIKES IN IRAQ


28 December 1998 – 31 December 1999

Since the beginning of the present series of air strikes by the Allied war planes in the Northern and Southern no-fly-zones of Iraq on 28 December 1998 and until the end of December 1999, bombing has reportedly taken place on 132 out of 369 days – i.e., 36% of the days had witnessed air strikes either in the Northern or in the Southern or both Northern and Southern no-fly-zones. On 56 days, the airstrikes resulted in civilian casualties. According to available information, supplied by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), which in 5 cases were directly verified as correct by UN teams, 144 civilians had died and 446 civilians had sustained varying injuries as a result of these air strikes (57 deaths and 133 injuries in the Northern-no-fly-zone and 87 deaths and 313 injuries in the Southern no-fly-zone). Statistics show that if each day's air strike is treated as an incident, **42% of the total number of incidents resulted in civilian casualties**. In effect, every second day of airstrikes lead to civilian casualties! Available information indicates that civilians lost their lives in 35 different locations and they sustained injuries in 64 different locations. 85 houses were also partially or fully demolished in the process.

The maximum impact was felt around the city of Basrah in the South and the city of Mosul in the North (see chart). Two self-explanatory maps showing the impact of air strikes, a table and a chart showing the civilian casualties and the chronology of the air strikes (as recorded by Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator/Iraq, Baghdad) are attached.

PATTERN OF REPORTED AIRSTRIKES IN IRAQ

28 Dec.1998 - 31 Dec. 1999




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* Locations are indicative

- Death
- ◊ Injury
- ◎ Death and Injury
- Physical damage

AIRSTRIKES INVOLVING REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ

28 Dec. 1998 - 31 Dec. 1999




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* Locations are indicative

- Death
- ✖ Injury
- ◎ Death and Injury

CHART SHOWING REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ-GOVERNORATES

28 Dec. 1998 - 31 Des. 1999



AIRSTRIKES
TABLE SHOWING REPORTED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND
DAMAGES IN IRAQ

28 Dec.1998 - 31 Dec.1999

NO	DATE	AREA	GOVERNORATE	KILLED	INJURED	OTHER DAMAGES
1	25/1/99	Al-Jamhuriyah	Basrah	6	64	34 Houses were destroyed.
2	25/1/99	Abu-Kaseeb	Basrah	11	36	11 Houses were destroyed.
3	10/2/99	Al-hizam	Najaf	1	8	
4	13/2/99	Basrah	Basrah	3	5	
5	15/2/99	Thiqar	Thiqar	5	22	
6	22/2/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	2	
7	22/2/99	Basrah	Basrah	1	1	
8	24/2/99	Al-Iskandariyah	Hillah	3	5	
9	27/2/99	Near Amarah	Missan	0	23	
10	28/2/99	Rab'ea	Ninewa	3	0	
11	28/2/99	120 km S Zakho	Ninewa	1	2	
12	1/3/99	Ain Zala	Ninewa	1	9	
13	6/3/99	Near Amarah	Missan	0	5	
14	8/3/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	
15	15/3/99	Amarah	Missan	0	1	
16	19/3/99	Samawa	Al-Muthanna	0	1	
17	11/4/99	Thiqar	Thiqar	2	9	
18	17/4/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	4	1	
19	24/4/99	Al-Qadissiya	Al-Qadissiya	0	5	
20	27/4/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	1	0	
21	29/4/99	Al-Wehdah	Ninewa	0	19	14 Houses were destroyed.
22	30/4/99	Kuban	Ninewa	7	0	101 Livestock were killed and 1 Pickup was destroyed.
23	7/5/99	Basrah	Basrah	3	0	
24	9/5/99	Abu-Kaseeb	Basrah	1	2	
25	9/5/99	Qarna	Basrah	3	3	1 House was destroyed.
26	10/5/99	Ninewa	Ninewa	0	1	
27	11/5/99	Al-Alwa	Basrah	1	2	
28	12/5/99	Basrah	Basrah	2	7	
29	12/5/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	14	22	300 Livestock were killed. Also harvester, 1 vehicle and 1 wagon were destroyed.
30	23/5/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	2	
31	2/6/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	3	
32	3/6/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	3	
33	8/6/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	1	0	
34	16/6/99	Thiqar	Thiqar	0	1	
35	18/6/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	
36	21/6/99	Samawa	Al-Muthanna	0	6	
37	24/6/99	Near Basrah	Basrah	0	4	

38	25/6/99	Near Nassiriyah	Thiqar	1	5	
39	14/7/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	3	
40	18/7/99	Abu Sukhayr	Najaf	17	18	5 houses were destroyed.
41	29/7/99	Al-Kut	Wasit	8	25	
42	29/7/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	
43	30/7/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	6	21	
44	30/7/99	Najaf	Najaf	3	2	
45	4/8/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	1	2	
46	10/8/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	2	
47	10/8/99	Near Basrah	Basrah	0	1	
48	15/8/99	Saddam Dam	Ninewa	0	3	
49	15/8/99	Al-Rabania & Al-Huda	Missan	0	4	3 houses were destroyed.
50	16/8/99	Missan	Missan	3	9	
51	17/8/99	Southern Mosul	Ninewa	8	9	
52	17/8/99	Missan	Missan	0	1	
53	17/8/99	Jassan	Wasit	11	1	
54	23/8/99	Basheeka	Ninewa	2	1	
55	28/8/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	5	
56	3/9/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	
57	9/9/99	Missan	Missan	0	11	
58	9/9/99	Al-Muthanna	Al-Muthanna	1	2	
59	21/9/99	Ur	Thiqar	0	1	
60	27/9/99	Al-Mizbaniyah	Missan	0	6	5 houses were destroyed.
61	27/9/99	Abu Shateeb	Missan	0	12	12 houses were destroyed and livestock were killed.
62	16/10/99	Near Kut	Wasit	1	2	
63	25/10/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	2	7	
64	28/10/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	
65	30/10/99	Near Basrah	Basrah	0	1	
66	5/11/99	Near Basrah	Basrah	0	2	
	28/11/99	Mosul	Ninewa	0	8	A primary school, nearby houses and 2 civilian cars were damaged.
68	4/12/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	0	1	One person was injured near Mosul.
69	12/12/99	Near Mosul	Ninewa	6	2	Two children were killed. Six people were injured, including one woman and five children. Three houses were damaged.
TOTAL				144	446	85 houses were destroyed and livestock were killed.

**SECURITY INCIDENTS RELATED TO AERIAL CONFRONTATION
AS AT 31 Dec. 1999**

No.	DATE	TIME	INCIDENT	REMARKS
1	28/12/98	N/A	US jets hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
2	5/1/99	N/A	Clashes between Iraqi aircrafts and US aircrafts in the southern no-fly-zone	Details not known
3	11/1/99	N/A	US jets hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
4	12/1/99	N/A	US Warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
5	13/1/99	N/A	US Warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
		N/A	US Warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Basra city.	Details not known
6	23/1/99	N/A	US fighters struck two Iraqi air defence missile batteries in southern Iraq.	Details not known
7	24/1/99	N/A	Allied warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
8	25/1/99	9:30 A.M. 10:10 A.M.	A Cruise missile struck Al-Jumhuriya residential area, while bombers attacked Abu Flos, Abu Kaseeb, Basra airport and Al-Rumeila oil field.	17 persons were killed, 100 persons were injured and 45 houses were damaged.
9	26/1/99	N/A	US Warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Mosul city.	Details not known
10	29/1/99	N/A	Allied fighters fired 17 missiles on Iraqi air defences in the northern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
11	30/1/99	N/A	Allied fighters fired 7 missiles on Iraqi air defences in the southern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
		N/A	Allied fighters fired one missile on Iraqi air defences near Mosul city.	Details not known
12	2/2/99	16:00 P.M.	Allied fighters fired 3 air-to-ground missiles, a food supply centre (warehouse) in Al-Najaf was hit.	Details not known
		N/A	Allied fighters fired 3 air-to-ground missiles near Mosul city.	Details not known
		13:03-15:00 PM	Surface to surface missiles fired from GOI side during US/UK air raid hit Dohuk area. One Missile hit the ground south of Dohuk city-10 Km from the dividing line. Three missiles hit the ground in Kharab Daym village-22 Km west of Dohuk. Three missiles exploded in the air near Kharab Mulk village-21 Km west of Dohuk. Fragments fell on the Ground. One missile exploded in the air near Sharia village-6 Km west of Dohuk. Fragments fell on the ground.	No Damage.
13	9/2/99	Around 13:00 PM	One Missile hit the ground in Sumail village-12 Km west of Dohuk, and another one hit the ground in Moqbal village-6 Km west of Dohuk. Missiles hits in northern and southern no-fly-zones.	No Damage.
14	10/2/99	Around 12:00 P.M.	Allied jets fired 14 bombs and missiles at Iraqi defences in Thiqar and Najaf. Air defences in Basrah and northern no-fly-zone were also hit.	In Najaf at Al-Hizam area, one person was killed and 8 were injured.
		N/A	Allied fighters fired air-to-ground missiles at the defences in the northern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
15	11/2/99	N/A	Allied fighters fired air-to-ground missiles at the defences in the northern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
16	12/2/99	N/A	(19) Surface to surface missiles fired from GOI side during US/UK air raid hit Dohuk area. (13) exploded on the ground, unoccupied newly constructed house. 6 missiles did not explode. Sharia village, 4.5 km south of Dohuk was hit by two missiles. Tikkish village, 9 km was also hit. Allied fighters fired air-to-ground missiles at the air defences in the northern no-fly-zone.	extensive damage to a 3 storey house in Dohuk.
17	13/2/99	Around Noon	A civil institution in Thiqar was attacked. Another bombing took place in Al-Fao city. A fishermen's jetty was hit and some civilians were injured. An air defence site in Al-Fao, southern Iraq, and targets near Talil, 200 km south of Baghdad were also hit.	Three civilians were killed and many others were injured.
18	15/2/99	N/A	Allied fighters bombed areas around Thiqar, Missan and Basra. 33 explosions were reported from three villages, previously affected by the shelling around Dohuk city. Most of the explosions took place in the air and no damage has been reported.	5 persons were killed and 22 were injured.
19	16/2/99	10:00	Allied warplanes attacked several sites located in the southern no fly zone.	Details not known
20	19/2/99	N/A	Allied jets fired a target in the northern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
21	21/2/99	16:35-18:00	Allied warplanes hit anti aircraft bases near Basra city, Amarah and Talil.	Details not known
22	22/2/99	13:00-18:00 hrs	Allied warplanes dropped 11 laser-guided bombs on multiple Iraqi anti-aircraft guns and radar sites near the city of Mosul in the northern Iraqi no-fly zone. Allied warplanes hit an anti aircraft base near Basra city.	Two civilians were injured in Mosul. One was killed and another one was injured near Basra city.

23	23/2/99	15:40-18:00 hrs	Allied warplanes hit anti aircraft bases in Basra city, Thiqar, Al-Muthanna and Missan. - In the northern no-fly-zone the allied jets flew over Dohuk, Ninewa and Erbil and hit an anti-aircraft base.	Details not known
24	24/2/99	18:50 Hrs	Allied warplanes attacked Al- Iskenderiya about 55 km south of Baghdad.	3 civilians were killed and 5 were wounded.
25	27/2/99	09:40 hrs	Allied warplanes flew over Meisan, Basra, Dhiqar, Najaf and Muthana, and military sites were hit in Missan (Amarah).	23 civilians were wounded in Amarah.
26	28/2/99	12:00 hrs	Allied warplanes attacked sites in the northern no-fly-zone near Mosul city	3 civilians were killed in the Rabe'ea and Al-tynlyh villages.
		14:30 hrs	Communication centre of oil repeater station No. 6 (120km south of Zakho) hit by allied missiles.	One person was killed and two others were injured.
27	1/3/99	14:30 hrs	Severe missile attacks around Mosul city -30 Bombs- communication centre targeted. 2nd oil control system (communication) near Ain Zala (Mosul) hit.	One civilian was killed and nine were injured.
28	4/3/99	14:15 hrs	Allied warplanes attacked an Iraqi radar site 22 km south of Basra city (Ish Shuaibah).	Details not known
	4/3/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attacked the southern governorates of Basrah, Thi-qar and Al-Muthanna. Warplanes dropped two bombs on a private farm in Basrah.	Details not known
29	6/3/99	09:50-14:00 hrs	Allied warplanes fired at utilities and several military sites in the southern governorates of Basrah, Missan, Thi-qar and Al-Muthanna.	Several civilians were injured.
30	8/3/99	09:50-14:00 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed areas around Mosul.	One person was injured.
		11:15-19:00 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out bombing in the southern no-fly-zone. Another air raid took place in the evening in the southern governorates of Thi-qar, Basrah, Missan and Muthanna. Five bombs were fired at air defence sites.	Details not known
31	9/3/99	11:30-13:30 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed utility buildings and military weapons around Mosul.	Details not known
32	10/3/99	N/A	Allied warplanes bombed several sites in the south no fly zone.	Details not known
33	12/3/99	11:50-15:10 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed some utility buildings and some anti-aircraft weapon sites around Mosul.	Details not known
34	14/3/99	12:45 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out bombing in the northern and southern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
35	15/3/99	09:45-16:00 hrs	Allied jets made several sorties in the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Missan, Basrah, and Najaf.	One civilian was injured.
		12:15 hrs	Allied jets fired eight bombs at utility buildings and military sites in the northern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
36	16/3/99	11:45-12:15 hrs	Allied jets attacked several weapon sites and utility buildings in Mosul.	Details not known
37	19/3/99	N/A	Allied jets made several sorties the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Missan, Basrah, and Najaf. They fired at utility buildings and weapon sites.	One civilian was injured.
38	1/4/99	18:00 HRS	Allied warplanes carried out bombing in the northern and southern no-fly-zones.	Warplanes bombed and destroyed a key control centre at Hamdan Station, the main pumping station used by Iraq to export oil via the southern Iraqi terminal of mina-al-Bakar.
39	4/4/99	14:30 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out several sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. The planes raided the village of Effach in Qadessiya governante.	An Iraqi oil pipeline control station in southern Iraq at Al-Uzair Station was damaged.
40	7/4/99	13:25-15:35 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out 40 sorties in the southern no-fly-zone.	Details not known
41	10/4/99	09:22-11:52 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out 33 sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. The planes overflew the areas of Artawi, Al-Salman, Samawa, Diwaniya, Al-Jaliba and Nasiriyah.	Details not known
42	11/4/99	12:40 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out 23 sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. The planes overflew Artawa, Al-Jaliba, Al-Salman, Samawa and Qla'at Sukkar villages, firing at utility buildings and weapons sites.	Two civilians were killed and nine were injured.
43	15/4/99	15:20-16:50 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out several sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. They have dropped 16 bombs at utility buildings and weapon sites Near Basrah.	Details not known
44	17/4/99	11:45-15:45 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out several sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. Another air raid took place in the northern no-fly-zone.	4 civilians were killed and one was injured in the area around Mosul city.
45	19/4/99	15:00 hrs	US and UK jets carried out 36 sorties over Nassiriya, Samawa, Basrah, Imara and Najaf governorates.	Details not known
46	24/4/99	N/A	Allied warplanes bombed some arable land in Al-Qadissiya governante.	An unspecified number of civilians were injured.

47	27/4/99	14:50 hrs	Allied war planes carried out 31 sorties over Ninewa Governorate.	One civilian was killed.
48	29/4/99	14:30 hrs	Allied war planes carried out several sorties over the areas of Ninewa Governorate. The jets fired one missile at a residential area in Al-Wehdah/Mousl city.	At Al-Wahda area of Mosul, 19 civilians were injured and 14 houses were damaged.
49	30/4/99	13:00 hrs	Allied war planes carried out several sorties over the areas of Ninewa Governorate. The jets fired four missiles at Bashiqa area near Mosul city.	At Kuban village (30 km-Mosul) 7 civilians were killed, a shepherd and six members of his family. 101 livestock were killed and 1 vehicle was damaged.
50	7/5/99	N/A	Allied jets carried out 48 sorties over the southern governorates of Basrah, Missan and Muthanna. In the northern no-fly-zone allied planes carried out 18 sorties over the governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Mosul.	Three civilians were killed.
51	9/5/99	N/A	Allied jet-fighters carried out bombing in the governorates of Thi-Qar, Basrah, Muthanna, Al-Mosa, Al-Alwa, Al-Sarife and Missan.	At Abu-El-Khasaab one citizen was killed and two others were wounded. At Qurna Three civilians were killed and three were wounded in a house.
52	10/5/99	10:05-15:55 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out bombing in Ninawa. Allied warplanes flew over the governorates of Basrah, Muthanna and Thi-Qar.	One civilian was injured in the North.
53	11/5/99	11:30 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed a military installation 80 Km. north of Basrah city. The location is 10 m. far from the main road at Al Mosa, Al Alwa, Al- Qurna and Al Sarife.	One civilian and three soldiers were killed and two were injured.
54	12/5/99	11:05 hrs	Allied war planes flew over the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Basrah and Missan. In the northern no fly-zones, skirmishes took place yesterday afternoon. The planes reportedly fired at service facilities around Mosul.	Two were killed and seven others were wounded in the south. Air strike between 11:00hrs and 13:00 hrs in the village of Abuwini, 90 km NW of Mosul. 14 shepherds/farmers were killed and 22 were injured. 300 livestock were also killed, 1 vehicle, 1 wagon and 1 harvester were destroyed.
55	15/5/99	11:25	Allied war planes attacked installations south to the 36 latitude and some military sites in Mosul.	No casualties were reported.
56	23/5/99	10:20	Allied warplanes attacked installations and military sites near Mosul.	Two civilians were injured.
57	25/5/99	13:00	Allied warplanes attacked service facilities in Mosul causing some damage.	No casualties were reported.
58	2/6/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military camps south to Mosul city.	Three civilians were injured.
59	3/6/99	11:03	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military camps near to Mosul city.	Three civilians were injured.
60	6/6/99	12:00-17:45	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military camps in Muthanna and Thiqar governorate.	Details not known
61	8/6/99	10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military sites near to Mosul city.	One person was killed in Bertella village.
62	9/6/99	18:29	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military sites near Mosul and in southern no-fly-zone.	Details not Known.
63	15/6/99	10:32	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military sites in Mosul city.	No casualties were reported.
64	16/6/99	16:30	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military sites in Thiqar, Basrah, Najaf, Missan and Qadissiyah.	One person was injured.
65	18/6/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities and military sites east to Mosul city.	One person was injured.
66	21/6/99	11:30-14:00	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities north and east to Mosul city. Another air strike took place in the southern no-fly-zone near Samawa.	6 persons were injured in Samawa.
67	22/6/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities near Mosul city.	No details were known.
68	24/6/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities in Basrah, Thiqar, Nissan and Muthanna.	Four person were injured
69	25/6/99	18:59	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities in Basrah, Thiqar, Nissan and Muthanna.	One person was killed in Al-Gharraf village near Nasiriyah and several others wounded in different places in Nasiriyah.
70	28/6/99	16:41	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities in the northern no-fly-zone south-west to Mosul city.	No casualties were reported.
71	2/7/99	12:30-14:30	Allied warplanes attacked radar Facility near Mosul City.	No casualties were reported.
72	8/7/99	18:07	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities in the northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
73	13/7/99	9:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and 13 air defence targets near Mosul in the northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
74	14/7/99	12:33	Allied warplanes attacked several military and radar sites west of Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone.	3 persons were injured.
75	16/7/99	9:55 & 16:20	Allied warplanes hit communications center in the south-east of Mosul.	No casualties were reported.

76	18/7/99	11:20 & 17:40 11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities in the southern no-fly-zone in Abu Sukhayr between Najaf and Samawa (12 km south of Najaf, about 200 km from Baghdad) and Al-Khider on Samawa-Nasiriyah road (300 km south of Baghdad, about 40 south of Samawa). Another air strike took place in the northern no-fly-zone, several facilities were hit.	17 persons were killed and 18 were injured. A number of houses were demolished in Al-Manathra area in Abu Sukhayr in Najaf governorate. AFP news by Karim Sahib (July 20) reports: 4 missiles crashed on or near a main road leading south from the city of Najaf and several cars were burnt out in Sunday's attack-crater on the road. A pregnant woman and her husband were killed in a pick up truck and 6 others in an all terrain car.
77	26/7/99	10:02	Allied warplanes attacked radar site and facilities north of Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
78	27/7/99	10:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities near Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
79	28/7/99	19:25	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities near Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
80	29/7/99	6:10 & 10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities at Al-Kut (170 km south east of Baghdad). Several facilities near to Mosul city (Al-Jarrar and Al-Numanniyyah) in the northern no-fly-zone) were also hit.	8 persons were killed and 25 injured in Kut. 1 person was injured in Mosul.
81	30/7/99	10:10 & 11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations north and north west of Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone. Another air strike took place in the southern no-fly-zone, facility in Najaf was hit.	6 persons were killed and 21 were injured in the northern no-fly-zone near Mosul city. In the southern no-fly-zone 3 persons were killed and 2 were injured in Najaf. (Total 9 killed and 23 injured).
82	4/8/99	11:05	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in Ninewa.	One person was killed and 2 were injured.
83	8/8/99	N/A	Allied warplanes bombed anti-aircraft artillery sites north of the city of Mosul.	No details were known.
84	9/8/99	10:05	Allied warplanes bombed anti-aircraft artillery sites north of the city of Mosul.	No details were known.
85	10/8/99	10:00 10:55	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in Nineva. Also they attacked several sites in the south no-fly-zone near Basrah, Missan, Thiqar and Muthanna.	Two persons were injured in the North. One person was injured in the south in Al-Muthanna governorate.
86	13/8/99	10:33	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone near Mosul. For the first time since beginning of the aerial confrontation the Iraqi side used anti aircraft missiles.	No details were known.
87	15/8/99	10:15 11:02	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone near Mosul and southern no-fly-zone in Missan.	3 persons were injured and one mosque was destroyed in Saddam Dam area near Mosul. In Missan 4 persons were killed and few houses in Al-Rabania and Al-Huda were demolished.
88	16/8/99	10:30 15:10	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone, northern and western Mosul and southern no-fly-zone in Missan, Basrah, Al-Muthanna and Wasit.	3 persons were killed and 9 persons were injured in Missan.
89	17/8/99	10:35 14:07-15:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations outside of the no fly zone (below 36 parallel). Also they attacked several facilities in Missan, Basrah, Thiqar, Wasit and Al-Qadissiya.	8 persons were killed and 9 persons were injured in Mosul. 1 person was injured in Missan. 11 persons were killed and 1 injured in Jassan town in Wasit.
90	23/8/99	10:35 - 8:20	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities Near Mosul. Also they attacked several facilities in Al-Muthanna.	2 persons were killed and 1 person was injured in Basheeka City (Near Mosul).
91	24/8/99	13:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Near Mosul.	No details were known.
92	28/8/99	10:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone near Mosul.	5 persons were injured near Mosul.
93	1/9/99	11:05	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
94	2/9/99	17:07	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
95	3/9/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	1 person was injured.
96	9/9/99	9:15:00 & 12:05	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in Missan, Basrah, Thiqar	11 persons were injured in Basrah. 1 person was killed and 2 were injured in Al-Muthanna.
97	10/9/99	10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several sites near Mosul.	No casualties were reported.
98	13/9/99	11:00	Allied warplanes bombed near Mosul.	No details were known.
99	14/9/99	8:20-10:20	Allied warplanes bombed areas near Basrah.	No details were known.
100	21/9/99	13:30	Allied warplanes bombed UR (375 Km. South of Baghdad).	A Swedish Journalist named Jan Arrell (Goldenbeerg Post) sustained minor injuries. According to Jan, "the bomb hit 15 to 20 meters in front of our car just on the side of the road. The wind shields were broken."

101	25/9/99	12:30	Allied warplanes bombed Al-Fao peninsula near Iraq's Arabian coast.	No details were known.
		12:15	Allied warplanes bombed areas near Mosul city.	No details were known.
102	27/9/99	8:05:00- 21:00	Allied warplanes bombed areas close to Amarah and Kut, in southern Iraq.	According to INA 6 persons Including two girls were injured and a number of houses were demolished in Al Mezbaniyah village near Amarah. According to AFP, In Abu Shateeb (near Amarah), 12 persons, including three young children, were injured and 40 sheep were killed. Also a dozen houses were damaged.
103	3/10/99	16:38	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Near Mosul , also they bombed anti-aircraft artillery sites north of the city of Mosul.	No casualties were reported.
104	6/10/99	11:55	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Near Mosul, in northern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
105	11/10/99	17:12	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
106	14/10/1999	12:20	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Near Mosul, in northern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
107	16/10/1999	17:21	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	One person was killed and two were injured near Al-Kut.
108	17/10/1999	10:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Near Mosul, in northern Iraq .	No casualties were reported.
109	25/10/1999	10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations, near Mosul, in northern Iraq.	Two persons were killed and seven were injured near Mosul.
110	28/10/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations, near Mosul, in northern Iraq.	One person was injured near Mosul.
111	30/10/99	23:45	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	One person was injured.
112	1/11/99	12:40 17:30 12:20	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone northern and western Mosul and southern no-fly-zone in Missan, Basrah, Al-Muthanna and Wasit.	No casualties were reported.
106	3/11/99	11:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
114	5/11/99	10:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	Two persons were injured.
115	8/11/99	11:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
116	9/11/99	12:20	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	No casualties were reported.
117	11/11/99	9:30	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
118	13/11/99	18:30	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
119	14/11/99	9:30 11:10	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southern and northern Iraq near Mosul.	No casualties were reported.
120	18/11/99	17:05	Allied warplanes attacked several sites southern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
121	19/11/99	14:37	Allied warplanes attacked several sites southern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
122	22/11/99	11:05 11:38	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm and northern Iraq.	Eleven persons were injured near Al-Kofa.
123	28/11/99	11:05	Allied warplanes attaked Al-Zanabek primary school at Mosul / 400 Km, north of Baghdad.	Eight people, Including an unspecified number of women and three children, were injured. Apart from a school, nearby homes and two civilian cars were also damaged.
126	29/11/99	17:36	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
127	30/11/99	23:50	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
128	1/12/99	16:16	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
129	2/12/99	10:40 10:48	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm and northern Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
130	4/12/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several sites near Mosul, in northern Iraq .	One person was injured near Mosul.
131	6/12/99	10:40	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in southerm Iraq.	No casualties were reported.
132	12/12/99	10:47	Allied warplanes attacked several sites near Mosul, in northern Iraq.	Two children were killed and six persons were injured. Three houses were also damaged.

AIRSTRIKES INVOLVING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ
AS AT 31 Dec. 1999

No.	DATE	TIME	INCIDENT	REMARKS
1	25/1/99	9:30 A.M. 10:10 A.M.	A Cruise missile struck Al-Jumhuriya residential area, while bombers attacked Abu Flos, Abu Kaseeb, Basra airport and Al-Rumeila oil field.	17 persons were killed, 100 persons were injured and 45 houses were damaged.
2	10/2/99	Around 12:00 P.M.	Allied jets fired 14 bombs and missiles at Iraqi defences in Thiqar and Najaf. Air defences in Basrah and northern no-fly-zone were also hit.	In Najaf at Al-Hizam area, one person was killed and 8 were injured.
3	13/2/99	Around Noon	A civil institution in Thiqar was attacked. Another bombing took place in Al-Fao city. A fishermen's jetty was hit and some civilians were injured. An air defence site in Al-Fao, southern Iraq, and targets near Talil, 200 km south of Baghdad were also hit.	Three civilians were killed and many others were injured.
4	15/2/99	N/A	Allied fighters bombed areas around Thiqar, Missan and Basra. 33 explosions were reported from three villages, previously affected by the shelling around Dohuk city. Most of the explosions took place in the air and no damage has been reported.	5 civilian were killed and 22 were injured.
5	22/2/99	13:00-18:00 hrs	Allied warplanes dropped 11 laser-guided bombs on multiple Iraqi anti-aircraft guns and radar sites near the city of Mosul in the northern Iraqi no-fly zone.	Two civilians were injured in Mosul. One civilian was killed and another one was injured near Basrah city.
6	24/2/99	18:50 Hrs	Allied warplanes attacked Al-Iskenderiya about 55 km south of Baghdad.	3 civilians were killed and 5 were wounded.
7	27/2/99	09:40 hrs	Allied warplanes flew over Meisan, Basra, Dhiqar, Najaf and Muthana, civilian and military sites were hit in Missan (Amarah).	23 civilians were wounded in Amarah.
8	28/2/99	12:00 hrs	Allied warplanes attacked sites in the northern no-fly-zone near Mosul city	Three civilians were killed in the Rabe'a and Al-tyniyh villages.
		14:30 hrs	Communication centre of oil repeater station No. 6 (120km south of Zakho) hit by allied missiles.	One person was killed and two others were injured.
9	1/3/99	14:30 hrs	Severe missile attacks around Mosul city -30 Bombs-communication centre targeted. 2nd oil control system (communication) near Ain Zala (Mosul) hit.	One civilian was killed and nine were injured.

10	6/3/99	09:50-14:00 hrs	Allied warplanes fired at utilities and several military sites in the southern governorates of Basrah, Missan, Thi-qar and Al-Muthana.	Several civilians were injured.
11	8/3/99	09:50-14:00 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed areas around Mosul.	One person was injured.
12	15/3/99	09:45-16:00 hrs	Allied jets made several sorties in the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Missan, Basrah, and Najaf.	One civilian was injured.
13	19/3/99	N/A	Allied jets made several sorties the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthanna, Missan, Basrah, and Najaf. They fired at utility buildings and weapon sites.	One citizen was injured.
14	11/4/99	12:40 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out 23 sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. The planes overflew Artawa, Al-Jaliba, Al-Salman, Samawa and Qla'at Sukkar villages, firing at utility buildings and weapons sites.	Two civilians were killed and nine were injured.
15	17/4/99	11:45-15:45 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out several sorties in the southern no-fly-zone. Another air raid took place in the northern no-fly-zone.	4 civilians were killed and 1 was injured in the area around Mosul city.
16	24/4/99	N/A	Allied warplanes bombed some arable land in Al-Qadissiya governorate.	An unspecified number of civilians were injured.
17	27/4/99	14:50 hrs	Allied war planes carried out 31 sorties over Ninewa Governorate.	One civilian was killed.
18	29/4/99	14:30 hrs	Allied war planes carried out several sorties over the areas of Ninewa Governorate. The jets fired one missile at a residential area in Al-Wehdah/Mousl city.	At Al-Wahda area of Mosul, 19 civilians were injured and 14 houses were damaged.
19	30/4/99	13:00 hrs	Allied war planes carried out several sorties over the areas of Ninewa Governorate. The jets fired four missiles at Bashiqa area near Mousl city.	At Kuban village (30 km-Mosul) 7 civilians were killed, a shepherd and six members of his family. 101 livestock were killed and 1 vehicle was damaged.
20	7/5/99	N/A	Allied jets carried out 48 sorties over the southern governorates of Basrah, Missan and Muthana.	Three civilians were killed.
21	9/5/99	N/A	Allied jet-fighters carried out bombing in the governorates of Thi-Qar, Basrah, Muthanna, Al Mosa, Al Alwa, Al Sarffe and Missan.	At Abu-El-Khasaab one civilian was killed and two others were wounded. At Qurna Three civilians were killed and three were wounded in a house.
22	10/5/99	10:05-15:55 hrs	Allied warplanes carried out bombing in Ninewa. Allied warplanes flew over the governorates of Basrah, Muthana and Thi-Qar.	One civilian was injured in the North.

23	11/5/99	11:30 hrs	Allied warplanes bombed a military installation 80 Km. north of Basrah city. The location is 10 m. far from the main road at Al Mosa, Al Alwa, Al- Qurna and Al Sarffe.	One civilian and three soldiers were killed and two were injured.
24	12/5/99	11:05 hrs	Allied war planes flew over the governorates of Thi-Qar, Muthana, Basrah and Missan. In the	Two were killed and seven others were wounded in the south. Air strike between 11:00hrs and 13:00 hrs in the village of Abuwini, 90 km NW of Mosul. 14 shepherds/farmers were killed and 22 were injured. 300 livestock were also killed, 1 vehicle, 1 wagon and 1 harvester were destroyed.
25	23/5/99	10:20	Allied warplanes attacked several installations and military sites near Mosul.	Two civilians were injured.
26	2/6/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities and military camps south to Mosul city.	Three civilians were injured.
27	3/6/99	11:03	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities and military camps near to Mosul city.	Three civilians were injured.
28	8/6/99	10:30	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities and military sites near to Mosul city.	One person was Killed in Bertella village.
29	16/6/99	16:30	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities and military sites in Thiqar, Basrah, Najaf, Missan and Qadissiyah.	One person was injured.
30	18/6/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities and military sites east to Mosul city.	One person was injured.
31	21/6/99	11:30-14:00	Allied warplanes attacked several service facilities north and east to Mosul city. Another air strike took place in the southern no-fly-zone near Samawa.	6 persons were injured in Samawa.
32	24/6/99	N/A	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities in Basrah, Thiqar, Nissan and Mutharia.	Four person were injured
33	25/6/99	18:59	Allied warplanes attaked several service facilities in Basrah, Thiqar, Nissan and Mutharia.	One person was killed in Al-Gharraf village near Nasiriyah and several others wounded indifferent places in Nasiriyah.
34	14/7/99	12:33	Allied warplanes attaked several military and radar sites west of Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone.	3 persons were injured.
35	18/7/99	11:20 & 17:40 11:00	Allied warplanes attaked several facilities in the southern no-fly-zone in Abu Sukhayr between Najaf and Samawa (12 km south of Najaf, about 200 km from Baghdad) and Al-Khider on Samawa-Nasiriyah road (300 km south of Baghdad, about 40 south of Samawa). Another air strike took place in the northern no-fly-zone, several facilities were hit.	17 persons were killed and 18 were injured. A number of houses were demolished in Al-Manathra area in Abu Sukhayr in Najaf governorate. AFP news by Karim Sahib (July 20) reports:4 missiles crashed on or near a main road leading south from the city of Najaf and several cars were burnt out in Sunday's attack-crater on the road- A pregnant woman and her husband were killed in a pick up truck and 6 others in an all terrain car.

36	29/7/99	6:10 & 10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities at Al-Kut (170 km south east of Baghdad). Several facilities near to Mosul city (Al-Jarrar and Al-Numanniyyah) in the northern no-fly-zone) were also hit.	8 persons were killed and 25 injured in Kut. 1 person was injured in Mosul.
37	30/7/99	10:10 & 11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations north and north west of Mosul city in the northern no-fly-zone. Another air strike took place in the southern no-fly-zone, facility in Najaf was hit.	6 persons were killed and 21 were injured in the northern no-fly-zone near Mosul city. In the southern no-fly-zone 3 persons were killed and 2 were injured in Najaf. (Total 9 killed and 23 injured).
38	4/8/99	11:05	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations Ninewa.	One person was killed and 2 were injured.
39	10/8/99	10:00 10:55	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in Ninewa. Also they attacked several sites in the south no-fly-zone near Basrah, Missan, Thiqar and Muthanna.	Two persons were injured in the North. One person was injured in the south in Al-Muthanna governorate.
40	15/8/99	10:15 11:02	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone near Mosul and southern no-fly-zone in Missan.	3 persons were injured and one mosque was destroyed in Saddam Dam area near Mosul. In Missan 4 persons were killed and few houses in Al-Rabania and Al-Huda were demolished.
41	16/8/99	10:30 15:10	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone northern and western Mosul and southern no-fly-zone in Missan, Basrah, Al-Muthanna and Wasit.	3 persons were killed and 9 persons were injured in Missan.
42	17/8/99	10:35 14:07-15:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations outside of the no fly zone (below 36 parallel). Also they attacked several facilities in Missan, Basrah, Thiqar, Wasit and Al-Qadissiya.	8 persons were killed and 9 persons were injured in Mosul. 1 person was injured in Missan. 11 persons were killed and 1 injured in Jassan town in Wasit.
43	23/8/99	10:35 - 8:20	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities Near Mosul. Also they attacked several facilities in Al-Muthannah.	2 persons were killed and 1 person was injured in Basheeka City (Near Mosul).
44	28/8/99	10:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern no-fly-zone near Mosul.	5 persons were injured near Mosul.
45	3/9/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations near Mosul in northern no-fly-zone.	1 person was injured.
46	9/9/99	9:15:00 & 12:05	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in Missan, Basrah, Thiqar and Wasit. Also they hit a grain warehouse in Al-Muthanna governorate 270 km south of Baghdad.	11 persons were injured in Basrah. 1 person was Killed and 2 were Injured in Al Muthana.

47	21/9/99	13:30	Allied warplanes bombed UR (375 Km. South of Baghdad).	A Swedish journalist named Jan Arrell (Goldenbeerg Post) sustained minor injuries. According to Jan, "the bomb hit 15 to 20 meters in front of our car just on the side of the road. The wind Shields were broken."
48	27/9/99	8:05:00- 21:00	Allied warplanes bombed areas close to Amarah and Kut in southern Iraq.	According to INA 6 persons including two girls were injured and a number of houses were demolished in Al-Mezbaniyah village near Amarah. According to AFP, in Abu Shateeb (near Amarah), 12 persons, including three young children, were injured and 40 sheep were killed. Also a dozen houses were damaged.
49	16/10/99	13:40	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq, near Al-Kut.	One person was killed and two were injured near Al-Kut.
50	25/10/99	10:30	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern Iraq, near Mosul.	Two persons were killed and seven were injured near Mosul.
51	28/10/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in northern Iraq, near Mosul.	One person was injured near Mosul city.
52	30/10/99	23:45	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	One person was injured.
53	5/11/99	10:35	Allied warplanes attacked several facilities and service installations in southern Iraq.	Two persons were injured.
54	28/11/99	11:05	Allied warplanes attacked Al-Zanabek primary school at Mosul / 400 Km, north of Baghdad.	Eight people, including an unspecified number of women and three children, were injured. Apart from a school, nearby homes and two civilian cars were also damaged.
55	4/12/99	11:00	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in northern Iraq, near Mosul.	One person was injured near Mosul.
56	12/12/99	10:47	Allied warplanes attacked several sites in northern Iraq, near Mosul.	Two children were killed and six persons were injured, including one woman and five children. Three houses were also damaged.

1) Iraqi News Agency.

2) BBC & CNN.

3) AFP.